JUNE 1996

THE UNESCO COURIER

CORRUPTION



INTERVIEW:
ISMAIL SERAGELDIN

HERITAGE:
RILA, A MONASTERY IN THE MOUNTAINS

ENVIRONMENT:
WATERWORLDS

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E N C O U N T E R S

We invite readers to send us photographs to be considered for publication in this feature. Your photo should show a painting, a sculpture, piece of architecture or any other subject which seems to be an example of cross-fertilization between cultures. Alternatively, you could send us pictures of two works from different cultural backgrounds in which you see some striking connection or resemblance. Please add a short caption to all photographs.

Sacred Geometry

1994, oil on wood
(circular panel, diameter 80 cm)
by Jacqueline Nioncel

In this dynamic composition the artist has placed four pictures charged with spiritual meaning around the arms of a swastika, an Indian emblem of prosperity. Three of the pictures are inspired by Egyptian, Hindu and Christian religious traditions respectively. The artist describes the topmost picture, a direct expression of her own spiritual quest, as representing "the Spirit, symbol of the energy that joins and stimulates masculine and feminine, positive and negative, yin and yang". The juxtaposition of these four visions of the sacred helps to create a sense of unity in diversity and is seen by the artist as a kind of composite mandala.

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© Jean-Pierre Gaüzère, Paris

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L. Ruiz Pastor © INCAFO, Madrid

Rila monastery *in Bulgaria is remarkable for its spiritual life, its history and its architecture (p. 42).*

Cover: The hand of corruption, a drawing by Jean-Pierre Gaüzère.
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Interview

Ismail Serageldin

talks to Bahgat Elnadi and Adel Rifaat

'A philosophy of development'

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), generally known as the World Bank, was established in 1945 as a result of decisions taken at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods (U.S.A.). It is a specialized agency of the United Nations. In the last 50 years it has developed many pioneering concepts and a philosophy of international aid. Here Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of the Bank responsible for its Department of Environmentally Sustainable Development, outlines for *Courier* readers the broad range of its activities.

■ **What exactly does the World Bank do?**

Ismail Serageldin: Its primary role is to finance development projects carried out by its member countries, especially the poorer ones. These projects are selected solely on the basis of economic criteria. When a borrower country exceeds a certain per capita income threshold, it becomes a donor country. A lot of countries have gone through this process, including some European countries.

■ **Has the Bank's philosophy changed over the years?**

I. S.: Yes. In contrast to what a lot of people seem to think, the Bank is changing constantly. Back in 1944, its primary goals were development aid and the fight against poverty, but they were harnessed to an immediate objective, that of post-war reconstruction in Europe. The Bank's first loan was made to France in 1947.

But the Marshall Plan, not the Bank, was the main financial tool in European reconstruction, and so the Bank was able to take an interest in the so-called "developing countries" early on. Although its resources were rather limited at the time, it brought off nothing less than a financial miracle.

In order to promote the private sector in these countries, without any guarantees from the governments concerned, it created the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1956.

Then, when the first African countries achieved independence,

Our approach to development is based on three inseparable aspects of the concept of sustainability: economic, social and environmental.

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some very poor countries needed loans at preferential rates but did not meet the Bank's solvency criteria. The International Development Association (IDA) was founded in 1960 to meet this need. This was the Bank's first major step in the war on poverty. Loans made by IDA can be interest-free for up to forty years with a ten-year grace period, whereas the World Bank usually makes fifteen- to twenty-year loans with only a three- to five-year grace period and an interest rate 0.5 per cent higher than that at which the Bank itself borrows.

In 1988 the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was established to encourage the flow of private sector credit to the poor countries by providing investors with guarantees against political and non-commercial risks in these countries.

■ When former United States Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara became President of the Bank in 1968, was his arrival welcomed?

I. S.: It certainly was! He brought new blood into the Bank. He was a very dynamic man with a strong grasp of essentials. At that time a big debate was going on as to whether or not the World Bank should be engaged in operations targeted at the poor—initially it had been concerned exclusively with countries' economic growth. Redistribution of income (investment in human resources) was regarded as a political matter, within the sphere of state sovereignty. This was the beginning of a process of reasoning which in 1991 culminated in the Bank's demonstration that growth and redistribution were complementary.

In 1973 Robert McNamara said in a speech in Nairobi that the Bank was committing itself to the war on poverty and targeting the lower 40 per cent of the income distribution, in other words those who were so poor that their condition was below any definition of human dignity. From then on economic growth and poverty reduction were the Bank's objectives. The idea of integrated rural development was launched, and the following year the Bank began to attack the problem of urban poverty. In 1975 it turned its attention to health and population.

■ Did the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the ensuing oil crisis have an effect on the Bank's policy?

I. S.: The enormous financial flow that accompanied the oil crisis triggered a rush to this new source of wealth by the commercial banks. The developing countries took out loans from these banks that their governments guaranteed without hesitation. The World Bank was against these so-called "sovereign" loans, which meant that the lending bank was not interested in what the borrower state did with the loan. The World Bank lends on governmental guarantees, but it is also obliged to make sure of the soundness of what

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Ismail Serageldin

is being planned. All the Bank's loans are linked to specific projects. If a road is being built, for example, the Bank pays as the work proceeds.

By the end of the 1970s many of the countries that had taken out "sovereign" loans from the commercial banks were hit by a collapse in the prices of the raw materials they exported. They were in deep trouble, short of currency and funds. (It is worth recalling here that the big problem of international debt involved commercial banks, not the World Bank). These countries then appealed to the World Bank for help, asking for loans—but without any specific projects in view, since their economic and financial situation made it impossible for them to continue work on projects that were already underway, never mind embarking on new ones.

■ And this was contrary to the World Bank's principles. . .

I. S.: Precisely. To help member states out of the deadlock, we had to understand why their financial institutions had got themselves into such a mess. That's when structural adjustment programmes came in. The liquidity loans that went with these programmes were regarded as exceptions to the Bank's rule; they were made to enable countries to achieve a more balanced position. At the time the Bank thought this phase would last only a short time.

But in 1983 the Bank realized that for many countries, mainly in Africa, structural adjustment was going to be a very long job. A study carried out at the request of African finance ministers made a clear diagnosis: African governments had run their economies badly, exchange rates were intolerable, and state-related structures were too heavily subsidized.

So the Bank insisted on the need for a moral agreement between creditors/lenders and African countries which were ready to put their house in order. Among other measures, the Special Fund for Africa was created to increase the IDA's lending capacity to the twenty-two most indebted nations.

This was a turning point in the international community's methods because for the first time the guarantee of a sovereign state was no longer enough. The borrower country had to put its economy in order. Lenders and creditors expected the World Bank to evaluate the efforts made in this regard by borrower countries. This position was officially adopted when the Special Fund for Africa, administered by the Bank, was created in February 1985.

■ What role did the International Monetary Fund (IMF) play in the debt crisis?

I. S.: A country has to be a member of the IMF before it can become a member of the World Bank. And once a year each member state has to review its financial and monetary management with the Fund, which then submits a report. In fact the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are complementary institutions. The latter looks after short-term balance—exchange rates, money stock and credit—and the former is concerned with long-term production and investment structures.

As the debt crisis grew, the commercial banks and other creditors accepted to reschedule provided the IMF was willing to monitor the economic and monetary situation on a quarterly basis. The Paris Club (creditor governments) and the London Club (commercial creditors) were founded at that time. The IMF played a very important role in matters relating to debt rescheduling and macro-economic stability, and the Bank in matters relating to structural adjustment for the long-term growth of the economy.

In 1987 the Bank launched a social programme to accompany structural adjustment measures and commissioned a long-term study on the conditions under which Africa could emerge from the crisis. One of the conclusions of the report[1], which was issued in 1989, was that there could be no solution to Africa's debt problem without effective governance.

■ How can this dilemma between politics and economics be resolved?

I. S.: The Bank's rules are quite clear on this. It is expressly forbidden for any member of the World Bank to intervene in the political affairs of a member state. And a regime's political hue cannot be used as a criterion in deciding whether or not to make a loan. By introducing the idea of "good governance", the Bank sparked off a debate every bit as lively as that about redistribution of income fifteen years before.

But it all depends on what you mean by politics. The minutiae of politics don't concern us. The political structures of the countries we deal with are not our business. On the other hand there are certain aspects of governance that we regard as essential for economic growth: openness, for

True development involves improving the status of women and empowering them to play an active part in society.

All the Bank's loans are linked to specific projects. If a road is being built, the Bank pays as the work proceeds.

example. When a country has no clear idea of the size of its external debt because several different ministers have had the right to authorize state expenditure, doubts arise about its governance. This is no longer, strictly speaking, a question of internal politics.

The second aspect is accountability, in particular justification of the use of funds. Suppose a country's power company makes massive losses and to make up for them turns to the public treasury, whose money comes from taxes on farm products. It cannot be denied that this is of concern to the Bank. Good governance cannot mean creaming off funds that should be used for investment to make up for deficits incurred by badly managed uncompetitive public-sector enterprises.

Thirdly, institutional pluralism is necessary to create an atmosphere that encourages better economic management. For that a country needs chambers of commerce, employers' federations and trade unions.

It is also indispensable that investors and other economic players should be kept informed of what the state is doing in the field of tax and income tax law. A survey of 121 projects carried out by the Bank shows that the ones that worked best were those in which the different economic players took part.

But more than anything else, the rule of law is absolutely essential. There can be no useful investment or serious investors without an investment code that clearly defines obligations, taxes, interest rates, rights, and so on. Investors also need to count on a reliable legal system. If there isn't one, they won't run the risk of investing in the country.

All these criteria of good management should help to create an encouraging general environment for economic activity.

■ As part of the same line of thinking, the Bank supports the idea of sustainable development. . .

I. S.: Our present approach is based on three indissociable aspects of the notion of sustainability: economic, social and environmental.

Sustainable development means giving future generations as much capital as we have had ourselves and the same opportunities to transform it into goods and services. These opportunities can easily be quantified. Our idea of what is meant by capital must be extended to include not only economic and financial capital, but also natural and human capital, in other words health, education and nutrition, and the social capital represented by investment in the structures that enable society to function. This is a new approach to the wealth of nations.

All social structures are based on the individual and the bonds existing between individuals. This gives rise to a paradox. We have to be free to act as individuals, but this freedom is meaningless if the individual is not in contact with others. Human beings must act socially and express their freedom but they must have a great degree of autonomy as well. This cooperation between individuals generates well-being and wealth.

All World Bank studies on the role of women show that women play a role of major importance in economic development. True development involves improving the status of women and empowering them to play an active part in society. Education and access to credit are essential components of this empowerment.

■ Economics, politics, culture and the environment are central to development. What about the spiritual aspect?

I. S.: A few years ago some of my colleagues and I wrote a book about this, called *Friday Morning Reflections at the World Bank: Essays in Values and Development*. We set up a small discussion group almost twenty years ago, and we meet every Friday morning to talk about the spiritual values of development. Our members include Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, atheists, and Jews. The book has four chapters, written by a Muslim, a Hindu, a Christian and an agnostic.

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Ismail Serageldin

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UNESCO IN ACTION... UNESCO IN

WORLD SCIENCE REPORT 1996

Biodiversity, environmental degradation, bioethics and the latest advances in information technology are among the issues examined in Unesco's *World Science Report 1996*, which has just been published. Written by an international team of experts, the 356-page book is divided into three sections devoted respectively to an overview of the rapid changes taking place in science, contemporary issues confronting scientists, and women in science and technology.

More than 140 figures, tables and charts illustrate the Report, which is a source-book for both specialists and the general public.

☛ *World Science Report 1996* may be obtained for US$45 or 220 French francs from Unesco Publishing, 1 rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France and on Internet: http://www.unesco.org

THE WORLD HERITAGE REVIEW

The first issue of a new international quarterly, the *World Heritage Review*, has just been published in English, French and Spanish editions by Unesco and the Spanish publishing house INCAFO. Its aim is to familiarize readers with the 470 cultural and natural sites of outstanding universal value that feature on the World Heritage List. The 80-page illustrated magazine is intended for an international readership, especially readers interested in conservation and environmental issues. In the first issue readers are taken to Angkor (Cambodia), the historic Pilgrimage Route to Santiago de Compostela (Spain) and Virunga National Park (Zaire), and can also learn what recent archaeological discoveries have revealed about the mysterious Mayan civilization in Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico.

☛ An annual 4-issue subscription is available for 140 French francs, £18 or US$29 (plus postage) from Unesco Publishing, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France. Tel: (33-1) 45 68 49 30; fax: (33-1) 42 73 30 07; e-mail: c.laje@unesco.org and on Internet: http://www.unesco.org

NEW AIDS RESEARCH CENTRES

Two Aids research centres have recently been opened, one at the Saint-Joseph Hospital (Paris), the other in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), as part of the World Foundation for Aids Research and Prevention created in 1993. Similar centres will be opened in Thailand, Japan and the United States. The centres have been established to encourage new approaches in the prevention and treatment of the HIV virus (in particular clinical and basic research). Each one will be adapted to the social and economic situations of the countries in which it is located.

Of the $8 million needed to start up and operate the Paris centre for the first two years $5.6 million have been raised from private donations and financial support from the French government. Donations from individuals and organizations wishing to help contribute to the centre's work may be sent to the World Foundation for Aids Research and Prevention, Professor Luc Montagnier, B. P. 500, 75726 Paris Cedex 15, France. CCP 11-12 P/Paris.

UNESCO IN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The World Federation of Unesco Clubs, Centres and Associations has come up with an original and informative way of celebrating Unesco's fiftieth anniversary. In the January-February 1996 issue of its newsletter, *Confluences*, it published a 50-question quiz on Unesco's role and its work since 1946, illustrating the Organization's wide range of contributions to the major issues of our times.

☛ For further information, please contact FMACU-WFUCA, Unesco House, 1 Rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15, France. Tel: (33-1) 45 68 28 18; fax: (33-1) 42 73 05 21; telex: 204 461 Paris.

UNESCO IN RWANDA AND BURUNDI

Two $1-million action plans were launched by Unesco on 25 March 1996 to help Rwanda and Burundi rebuild and develop their educational systems, media and democratic institutions.

The plans, developed in consultation with the two countries' authorities, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, build on current Unesco programmes in Rwanda and Burundi. The Rwanda plan provides for the creation of a centre for education on peace and democracy and also includes assistance for women, orphans and other victims of war and genocide. The Burundi plan includes 50 hours of radio and television programming on the theme of tolerance.

During an official visit to Kigali on 27 March 1996, Unesco Director-General Federico Mayor presented four tons of books and some $30,000 worth of sports equipment, all donated by private companies.

POVERTY TODAY

Research on poverty in Asia, Africa, the West (including Europe, North America and certain other industrialized countries) and Latin America is reviewed in *Poverty: A Global Review*, a 620-page handbook issued by the Comparative Research Programme on Poverty (CROP) in collaboration with Unesco's Social and Human Sciences sector. The work has been financed by Unesco and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and is published by the Scandinavian University Press.

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Month by month

In one of the opening scenes of a satirical film that enjoyed an enormous success in France a few years back, a seasoned—and corrupt—police officer describes his philosophy of life to a young and as yet untainted colleague as they stroll through the Paris streets. He explains how he uses his position to extort money from the local tradespeople. The young officer retorts that the police aren't there to break the law, but to enforce it. Taking him gently by the arm, the veteran points out that people all around them are violating the law without even realizing that they are doing so. He concludes that the law cannot be fully enforced without bringing social life to a standstill. An intelligent policeman should accept that this is how things are and—why not?—profit from it.

This disingenuous episode contains most of the sophistical arguments that are often used to justify corruption: trivialization (a pedestrian crossing a street against a traffic light is placed on the same level as a policeman running a protection racket); the use of non-sequiturs (illegal practices exist, therefore it is impossible to stop them); making a quantum leap from a factual observation to a value judgement ("Corruption is everywhere, long may it prevail!").

This issue of the *Courier* sets out to show that corruption is not inevitable and that it can and must be countered. We have endeavoured to look at corruption as a historical phenomenon, analysing the reasons for it and the forms it has taken at different times and places; to trace the borderline—if there is one—between excusable irregularity and unpardonable criminality; to identify ways and means of fighting the latter. We have tried to pinpoint new types of corruption arising from the globalization of the economy, drug trafficking and the formation of transnational mafias. Above all we have paid particular attention to the implications of this gangrene for democracy.

Corruption is an evil that affects all societies to some extent, and is even tending to asphyxiate the more fragile among them. It can be traced back in time as far as the earliest historical record, for a "society without evil" has never existed. Where there is inequality, corruption is not far away. But come what may, people everywhere continue to fight to limit injustice and contain corruption. How do they do this?

Tyrants who present themselves as "incorruptible" and claim to be restoring an ideal polity set up dictatorships where corruption flourishes behind the curtain of state secrecy. Democracies are not, of course, immune to corruption, but they succumb to it when they allow the existence of shadowy areas in which the misuse of power can spread unchecked. In the unending struggle against corruption, it is free citizens in societies based on the rule of law and the separation of powers who play the key role, as vigilant and effective defenders of the common good.

BAHGAT ELNADI AND ADEL RIFAAT

The roots of a long

by Biancamaria Fontana

Study of corruption's many forms since Antiquity throws light on the dangers it presents to modern democracy

© Jean-Loup Charmet, Paris

Ever since classical antiquity the central problem of politics in the West has been how to control individuals and groups inclined to put their own interests before the common good. For over 2,000 years corruption has been perceived as the main factor of political change, the recurrent cause of decline for inadequate regimes and of their replacement by more desirable ones. Only by bringing historical depth to our understanding of the problem of political corruption can we hope to go beyond the superficial response of bewilderment and moral condemnation.

To some extent the traditional conception of people as potentially corrupt or corruptible rests upon a pessimistic view of human nature, reinforced by religious belief in the imperfection of earthly things. But it also goes together with an appreciation of the density of social relations—hierarchies, structures of economic dependence, family ties, local solidarities, corporatist or confessional complicities. The world of classical politics is a crowded universe populated by clients, patrons, courtiers, schemers and sycophants, whereas the modern democratic state (at least in its ideal form) is a neutral, impersonal machine, set against an anonymous mass of equal citizens.

As the Scottish philosopher David Hume noted in 1742, people have a much stronger commitment to those who are close to them—family, friends, neighbours—than to vast, abstract entities such as a city, a nation or humankind at large. Similarly, human beings find it easier to act badly on behalf of a group such as a clan or a political party than individually, since the irregular behaviour of a group is usually easier to justify on ideological grounds than that of an individual.

The landscape of corruption depicted in classical literature is rich and diversified. In monarchies the main corrupting agent is the sovereign, and decadence trickles down from the top of the hierarchical ladder via the benefices and privileges dispensed by royal

favour. Through the skilful distribution of bribes, titles of nobility and public offices, or by threatening disgrace, the king manipulates those around him, undermining the autonomy of councils and parliaments and transforming an independent aristocracy into a class of courtiers and parasites. Once aristocratic freedom and honour have been destroyed, the regime succumbs to the crimes and excesses of arbitrary rule.

A permanent threat to stability

Under republican government, on the other hand, the danger comes from below, and corruption takes the form of the horizontal disintegration of the political community. Ambitious individuals, clans, and political factions constitute a permanent threat to the unity and stability of republican institutions. Through their networks of clients and allies, intriguers can influence in their favour the decisions of tribunals, manipulate nominations to the magistracy and assemblies, or monopolize lucrative public posts. In democratic regimes, where the populace enjoys voting rights, the votes of the poorer citizens can be openly bought and sold in return for money, food or gifts, a practice amply documented in European elections well into the nineteenth century. Sooner or later the degeneration of public and private morality, popular disaffection and the sinister designs of the rich and powerful precipitate the republic into fratricidal war or dictatorship.

In Western political culture, the traditional perception of decadence, corruption and the alternation of regimes changed radically around the beginning of the eighteenth century with the transition from "ancient" to "modern" republicanism.

In ancient republics such as Athens, Rome or the Italian city-states of the Renaissance, preventing corruption was essentially a matter of collective ethos and social control. True, some artificial devices were introduced to limit the risks of secret deals and manipulations. The members of councils and assemblies were often selected by drawing lots rather than by election, hazard being considered the best guarantee of impartiality. The tenure of public posts was short and re-election occasionally forbidden. Voting procedures were made deliberately slow and intricate (in Venice the rules prescribed for the nomination of the Doge make it look more like a chess competition or mathematical game than a political event). But everybody understood that these ingenious measures could have only superficial effects.

The true protection against corruption had to



Dailloux © Rapho, Paris

"The world of classical politics is a crowded universe populated by clients, patrons, courtiers, schemers and sycophants, whereas the modern democratic state (at least in its ideal form) is a neutral, impersonal machine, set against an anonymous mass of equal citizens." Above, photomontage. Opposite page, a ball at the court of François 1 of France in honour of the Emperor Charles V. Illustration by Albert Robida (1909).

BIANCAMARIA FONTANA of Italy is professor of the History of Political Ideas at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland). Notable among her recent works is *The Invention of the Modern Republic* (Cambridge University Press, 1993).

With the consolidation of the modern nation-state, the idea that virtue and honour would protect the political order from corruption met with increasing scepticism.



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A member of parliament before an election (above) and after (opposite page). Illustrations from the French weekly *Le Petit Journal* (1893).

come from civic education, from the surveillance that the community exercised upon the public and private behaviour of its citizens; from feelings of religious obligation, from attachment to municipal traditions and local identities. Virtue was, in other words, the only real guarantee of the preservation of republican institutions from decadence, and virtue went together with patriarchal habits, a simple life style, deep-felt patriotism and military commitment. Such views were not confined to moralists and utopians, horrified by the ostentatious luxury and sexual licence displayed by the Roman or Florentine *nouveau riches*, but were shared by writers as realistic and cynical as Machiavelli. Similarly, in Ancien Regime monarchy, aristocratic honour and Christian principles were supposed to combine to limit the corrupting ambitions of the sovereign. The sacral authority enjoyed by the monarch by divine right was inseparable from the constraints of religious morality.

Self-regulating mechanisms

With the consolidation of the modern nation-state—in large centralized monarchies such as France and England in the late seventeenth century and subsequently in the new republics that emerged from the American and French revolutions—the idea that virtue and honour would protect the political order from corruption met with increasing scepticism. For one thing the population of large territorial states was more difficult to control, and far less homogeneous in its religious beliefs and customs than the inhabitants of the ancient republics. Local identities were marginalized, and individual autonomy appeared more important than conformity to standards of civic virtue and commitment. But it was above all the changing attitude towards wealth on the part of eighteenth-century thinkers which altered their understanding of corruption. Wealth and economic prosperity, which classical writers had stigmatized as the main cause of political decline, were now regarded as a source of independence and stability, the desirable target of public and private efforts. The modern constitutional monarchy and the modern republic were not built upon the ancient ideals of austerity and simplicity, but on a wider distribution of property and the development of middle-sized fortunes.

Rather than entrusting the integrity of the state to the purity of its citizens, modern political theorists believed in the exploitation of self-regulating mechanisms which should work independently of the moral properties of political agents.

Some of these mechanisms were sociological and played upon the dynamics of interests and conflicts within the political community. Since in a large and complex society the state would not be in a position to control effectively the influence of different interest groups, it was easier to allow those groups to organize and rely upon competition between them to limit abuses. Naturally political parties would be inclined to bend laws and rules to promote their own influence; but several parties (the

English political system was built around the alternation of two, and this model was imitated by the authors of the American constitution) would take upon themselves the task of denouncing the irregularities committed by their competitors. Where ancient republicanism had consistently fought against factions, the legitimization of organized parties as vehicles, as it were, of limited and supervised corruption, was one of the great novelties introduced by modern republicanism. The scramble of partisans and political climbers to share out offices and benefits might not make a pretty sight, still less the scandals that opposing sides would unleash for electoral purposes, yet this solution would still be safer than the concentration of corrupt power in the hands of a single group, or the disintegration of institutions into anarchy and chaos.

Separation of powers and freedom of information

Other mechanisms introduced to fight against corruption were legal and formal. They consisted of a system of checks and balances which guaranteed the impartiality of the public administration by separating its different parts and functions. Once again, it was not necessary to imagine that the people entrusted with political power would prove honest and trustworthy. It was sufficient to ensure that corruption in one department would sooner or later run against the opposition of some other branch of government, which would react against the abuses.

Baron Charles Secondat de Montesquieu (1689-1755), a magistrate from Bordeaux who was one of the inventors of this doctrine, believed that the essential conditions for the equitable functioning of institutions were, first, that the three basic powers of the state—legislative, executive and judiciary—should be rigorously separated and independent from one another, and second, that all official deliberations should always be taken according to given forms and procedures, even if this slowed down the activity of the administration. The machine of state power should not be allowed to move too fast, since delays increased the chances of detecting and reversing any arbitrary initiatives taken by political agents.

There was of course a residual possibility that competition amongst the branches of government would prove insufficient and that the different powers would connive in some abusive practice. The ultimate resort to protect the impartiality of the state was the transparency of public acts and the vigilance of public opinion. In the long run, corrupt politicians would simply lose the support of the electorate. And since private individuals were generally ill-placed to detect the wrongdoings of their governors, it was the specific function of public opinion, in the form of an independent press, to uncover them.

This resort to public opinion as final guarantee of the accountability of the political system introduced an element of circularity in the reasoning: why should we assume that opinion itself would not be manipulated or



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Modern states continue to confront the issue of corruption by relying on competition between political forces, freedom of information, and the separation of powers.

corrupt? The answer to these anxieties was the preservation of pluralism: the protection of democracy from corruption and decline depended on breaking any potential monopoly over information. Again, the motivations of those who inform the public may be base and manipulative rather than virtuous. Even stern defenders of the freedom of the press like Benjamin Constant or John Stuart Mill knew that journalists would promote sectarian views, or simply try to sell papers; but they believed (rather like the contemporary theorists of postmodernism) that the flow of information would prove too shifting and unstable for consistent manipulation.

It is essentially along the lines of the eighteenth-century model of checks and balances that modern democratic states continue to confront the issue of corruption: by relying upon competition between political forces, freedom of information and the separation of powers. As a model it seems acceptable enough: where our chances of enforcing a shared vision of the public good are slighter than ever, the best we can do is cling on to the ideal, however thin, of the neutrality of political institutions.

Increased vigilance

The problem is that in preserving the scaffolding of democratic forms and guarantees, we have lost sight of the historical and human contexts in which it was first erected. We have forgotten how pessimistic were its premises; how imperfect and fragile the protection it offered; how the very idea of what constituted corruption depended throughout on the precarious compromise of conflicting interests.

Recent events in Italy help to illustrate this reality. A vast network of corrupt complicities, extending to all levels of government, has been uncovered and dismantled by the initiative of a small group of magistrates, representing an independent power, the judiciary.

From inside the gloomy walls of the Palazzo di Giustizia in Milan a handful of young judges and lawyers nobody had ever heard of systematically tracked down and brought to justice the most powerful men in the country, pulling them down from their pedestal of prestige and influence. But this is only part of the story. However capable and determined, the magistrates would have been stopped (as had happened in the past), had it not been for the accidental convergence of a series of circumstances: the uncovering of links between the Mafia and the political regime; growing popular disaffection—such as the desperate and courageous protest voiced by the Rete, a political party created in Palermo; the dissatisfaction of economic interest groups who, after making extensive usage of corrupt complicities, were finding them too crippling and onerous to sustain; the internal division and loss of electoral support of the governmental coalition.

In the past people used to think of political regimes as doomed, like all human things, to decadence and decline. Modern democracies tend to see themselves as durable, indeed perennial models: political leaderships, cultures, generations may pass on, but the machine will continue to run, provided we allow for some regular revisions and repairs, for the supply of spare parts. It is important to keep in mind that this view is, at best, just a fiction of theory. ■



A Palermo jail where almost 500 members of the Italian Mafia were tried in 1986.

Ferdinando Scianna © Magnum, Paris

The underside of globalization

by Flora Lewis

Corruption is an old story, one way or another as old as society. Periodically there have been explosions of anger from long-suffering, docile victims seeking to wipe it out. It has been a causal element in most revolutions, sometimes the dominant one. The disgust it provoked was a central urge in the Protestant Reformation. And it is still with us, all around the world, in the poorest and the richest countries.

But there are new aspects, as well as ancient habits, which make corruption in these days both easier to spread and more intolerable. One is easy movement of people, goods and money. Economic globalization has created tremendous new opportunities for illicit as well as productive creation of wealth. Another is the sheer volume of money that modern trade and construction make available. In traditional subsistence societies, oil can bring a sudden flood of riches easy for a few to tap with no compulsion to distribute reasonably. When there is large-scale building, government favours can be worth billions to be siphoned off in quantities never before imaginable.

And, on the other side, modern business requires assurances, a framework of law to give confidence in vast, long-term investment which arbitrary corruption undermines. Democracy by definition requires accountability, a rule of law based on an agreed sense of who is entitled to what. It may co-exist with corruption, but it is hard to reconcile and sooner or later there is a collision. Somebody blows the whistle and scandal erupts.

Part of the trouble is that corruption isn't easy to define. You may know it when you see it, but it is hard to spell out. In some ways, democracy promotes it by limiting the power of authority. Elections cost money. At what point

Transborder co-operation is needed to combat the tentacular grip of corruption



The hand of corruption, a drawing by Jean-Pierre Gauzère.

© Jean-Pierre Gauzère, Paris

does the equation of money and votes become criminal?

The Mafia in Sicily evolved as people banded together to resist cruel and rapacious overlords, and then extorted money for "protection" against its own ability to be cruel and greedy as well. Mussolini nearly wiped it out with his fascist police, because he didn't depend on elections and therefore didn't need the gangs to deliver the votes. The U.S. was to some extent responsible for reviving the network as an unintended result of World War II operations. Mafia member "Lucky" Luciano, then in an American jail, was recruited to go to Sicily before the Allied invasion clandestinely to prepare the way by encouraging his old friends among the islanders not to resist.

Then, as occupying forces moved in to set up civil government, they wanted to be sure not to reinstate the local fascists. They opened the jails and gave responsibilities to those whom Mussolini had imprisoned. But these weren't all anti-fascists. Some were just Mafiosi. They busied themselves delivering votes when the time came, to establish a new base, as well as exploiting the black market which always develops when there are shortages and too many controls without overwhelming official terror.

A vicious circle

Corruption tends to be a private enterprise, even within government structures, because official institutions can justify what they take on other grounds, valid or false. But of course, it is a mistake to think of corruption as the inevitable enemy of government. The worst cases always come from collusion that feeds on itself. The more money the corrupt can extract from smuggling, black marketing, intimidation, the more they can buy off police, judges and other officials to help promote their affairs.



C. Carrion © Sygma, Paris

Destruction of a drug haul (Paraguay).

There is a chicken-and-egg interdependence. The more government imposes petty restrictions, red tape, arbitrary rules, the greater the temptation to grease the way through it and when, as is usually the case, officials are poorly paid, the greater their susceptibility.

There are countries where this is a way of life, almost inescapable. But the complexity of modern economics adds a whole new dimension, piling layer on layer of illicit obligation. Contacts, connections, secret understandings are essential. The networks used to be primarily local. This is what has changed in the big open world.

Traffic in drugs is the most obvious case. Its enormity is obviously the result of an insatiable demand, beyond explanation in social theory but a clear sign of social and psychic pathology. Since consuming countries have no idea of what to do about it, they try to address the plague from the supply side which only increases the opportunities for corruption. Such fortunes have been amassed that they can hardly be spent and therefore they induce investment. That requires money-laundering, which didn't start with drugs but with tax havens taking advantage of the fact that every state has the right to make its own banking and currency laws.

The system functions because national authorities, jealous of sovereignty, have not organized against the increasingly intricate, widespread and well-organized criminal syndicates. The facility of communication has made

The complexity of modern economics adds a whole new dimension to corruption, piling layer on layer of illicit obligation.

FLORA LEWIS,
a noted American journalist specializing in international affairs, is the author of several books, including *Europe: Road to Unity* (1992).

possible links which add up to such a magnitude of resources that they can swamp vulnerable officialdom. It has been reported that Western drug traffickers route money through Russia, which may cost as high as 20 to 30 per cent of dollar face-value, but comes out as legitimate transfers which can then be deposited or invested anywhere. In the process, the Russian gangs enhance their ability to corrupt, extort and impose their will by violence.

Fighting back

There is a grave imbalance between the fragmented international system of laws and the increasingly well-knit international system of the lawless. It can't be corrected by blocking the flow of money and goods without disrupting everybody's economy. It requires a level of co-operation among governments and police forces which they are only beginning to envisage, and which some governments don't even consider because their establishments are beneficiaries of things as they are.

At times, it seems that cynicism and tolerance of corruption as the inevitable way of the world are unshakeable. It isn't that people don't know, they just don't know what to do about it until it suddenly becomes too much and they find a way to hit back. In recent years, this has happened in Italy, Japan, South Korea, France, Spain. It is a critical factor in the rise of Islamic fundamentalism because, deep down, most people find dishonesty a dirty and disagreeable way to live. It saps pride and dignity.

After the last Turkish election, a twenty-three-year-old shop-keeper named Erdol Nergiz explained his vote to a Western journalist. He said he has a Christian girl-friend, goes to discotheques and drinks alcohol, travels to Europe, but nonetheless gave his ballot to the Welfare Party, an Islamic movement which made strong gains in the secular state. "That shouldn't be my choice," he said. "But I did it because 80 per cent of the people in this country are poor and the leaders of the other parties don't do anything for them. The corruption and bribery here are just too much."

Violent crime and corruption, which often reinforce each other, played an important part in turning people to vote for the communist party in Russia's last parliamentary election. Under the dictatorship with its repression, there was relatively little private crime and generally at a low level. The regime had a monopoly on the use of force. To the extent that the state itself was corrupt, people had long been indoctrinated not to think of it that way. So many of them blamed reforms for the new lawlessness and, especially, the new uncertainties.

The persistence of corruption in all kinds of systems should make clear that it won't go away by itself. There have to be constant vigilance and rigorous rules. While democracy may make it harder to eliminate than the iron fist of authoritarianism, it also offers better tools for mobilizing people to resist corruption once they realize its pervasive perniciousness is intolerable. But for that to work, the democrats themselves have not only to be honest but to join in their determination to maintain an honest society.

And they need to join across the borders which have become so porous to criminals as well as to commerce. Since, after all, this is about money and the great plague is about very large amounts of money, the technical means for control are becoming available through the same electronic networks which move trillions worth of dollars around the globe each day. It can be done through the dozen or so major financial centres. That would take agreements among governments, big banks, big commodities traders going much further than ever before to track and report unjustifiable flows. Legitimate business is coming to see it is in their interest, as it is in the interest of societies everywhere to fight an ancient malady which threatens to be a raging epidemic. ■

Bernard Annebicque © Sygma, Paris

"Economic globalization has created tremendous new opportunities for illicit as well as productive creation of wealth." Above, a baggage trolley at an international airport.

"The technical means for control are becoming available through the same electronic networks which move trillions of dollars around the globe each day." Below, a computer manufacturing plant (U.S.A.).



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Corruption and democracy

by Donatella della Porta



Corruption is a disease that worsens by feeding on itself

Political corruption has long been considered a disease typical of the pathological but temporary phases that precede the advent of democracy.

According to this reading of events, it is particularly likely to develop during the abrupt transition from a traditional society to a modern society in which a clear distinction is made between the public and the private spheres.

It seems to be associated with broadening participation in political life, in a situation where there are no structured political parties to act as intermediaries between citizens and the state; with massive urbanization and a drift from the land that brings a mass of disoriented new city-dwellers into contact with the complex machinery of a remote bureaucracy; with the rapid development of modern means of production that subordinate everything to market forces; and with a process of rapid cultural modernization that mixes together different and in some cases conflicting value systems.

In all these cases, corruption seems to be an "unofficial" measure of structural adjustment designed to repair a social fabric that has disintegrated as a result of economic and political pressure; it is a phenomenon that will disappear as soon as market and democratic forces are normalized[1].

It should not be surprising, therefore, that political corruption has mainly been studied by researchers specializing in the Third World and in transitional countries. In the industrialized countries, political corruption should only be a limited, marginal phenomenon. In short, the spread of corruption ought to be inversely proportional to the spread of democracy.

In the last few years, these views on the limited and marginal nature of political corruption in the industrialized countries have had to be revised. The huge political and financial scandal that has implicated dozens of elected officials and industrialists in Italy seems to have spread to other European countries as well as those on the Mediterranean rim. "Model" democracies such as France and the United Kingdom have also been rocked by financial scandals that have tarnished the reputations of leading political figures.

In other words we must take a fresh look at the relationship between corruption and democracy. If the growth of democracy does not lead to the demise of political corruption, we must get to grips with those characteristics of the democratic system that encourage or authorize it.

Cracks in the system

Two characteristics of modern democracies seem to me to promote the development of corruption: the increased number of decisions taken in the public rather than the private sector, and administrative decentralization, which increases the number of decision-making centres. The growth of welfare programmes, the expansion of the public sector and the proliferation of laws and regulations all favour the spread of corruption. Moreover, local government opens a much broader potential field to corruption because of the large number of private contracts that are made and the likelihood of avoiding scrutiny by the central government.

But though it may be true that the risks of corruption grow in proportion to the growth of state leverage in economic life, it must be recognized that a whole range of procedures is available to prevent the discretionary powers

Corruption increases if the benefits expected from it are higher than the risk involved.

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

Philippe Ledru © Sygma, Paris

"The expansion of the public sector and the proliferation of laws and regulations favour the development of corruption."

of the administration from being arbitrarily used. If corruption exists in spite of these procedures, it is because obstacles prevent them from working properly. What are these obstacles? What are the conditions that encourage people to act illegally and profit from opportunities for corruption?

Like all economic agents, corrupters and corrupted obey rational motives based on a desire for gain. Corruption increases if the expected benefits from it are higher than the risk involved[2]. The extent of corruption is linked to the factors that determine its profitability.

The risks involved mainly consist of different kinds of sanctions (legal or administrative, official or unofficial) and the possibility of their being effectively used, which depends on the structure of the monitoring mechanisms. Where internal administrative procedures are concerned, one major deterrent is the existence of effective control mechanisms in government departments and offices. Monitoring procedures that apply both to bureaucracy and party financing are effective if the principle of separate accounting is fully respected and auditors have access to all the necessary data.

Investigating magistrates and an administrative inspectorate constitute a third kind of control mechanism, with the impact of possible sanctions depending on the investigators' degree of independence and on the material and legal means at their disposal. Concurrent holding of several offices, the overlapping of politics and the civil service, and the proliferation of purely formal checks are factors that reduce the risk that real sanctions will be taken. Finally, there is also a purely political check inherent in the idea of a change-over of power between political parties, in which case it is in the interest of opposition parties to denounce the actions of those in power in order to further their own chances of taking over. The absence of alternation in government over a long period may, therefore, eventually lead to corruption. It is also quite true that a corrupt political class may well co-operate to share the spoils between government and opposition parties.

"It was long thought that corruption developed during the abrupt transition from a traditional society to a modern society." Below, *Watching TV*, a painting by Tsing-Fang Chen (U.S.A.).

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Spiralling downward

Factors that influence the amount of gain from corruption are determined (for private interests) by the importance of administrative decisions and (for civil servants and elected officeholders) by the amount of money offered. For businesses, the bigger the market for their products in the public sector, the more they are at the mercy of civil service decision-makers. Furthermore, all things being equal, the greater the diversity of sources available to meet public-sector demand, the greater will be the temptation for businessmen to indulge in bribery to gain access to a market where competition is so fierce. As for government officials, they will be more inclined to accept bribes if they feel that their salaries or social status are inferior to their qualifications—especially when rewards in the private sector tend to be higher.

But perhaps the most important question is why some politicians are so much in need of money. The first point to be noted is that political expenses are caught in an inflationary spiral. If Candidate X spends enormous amounts on his election campaign, Candidate Y must follow suit if he wants to stand any chance of being elected. This escalation is particularly strong



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"In a corrupt regime, the vote is a kind of bargaining counter." Right, a painting by the Canadian artist Sandra Dionisi (1994).

when politicians' expenses, especially during election periods, are not subject to very close scrutiny.

Political expenses also depend on other considerations that determine the terms of competition between and within parties, starting with the frequency of elections, which in turn depends on a variety of factors including the number of elected assemblies, whether or not there are primaries, and whether the elections have one or two rounds. The nature of the contest between candidates is also influenced by the number and size of electoral colleges, the number of lists presented and whether the election result is decided by majority vote or by proportional representation.

The role of political parties

The most important parameters that concern us here relate to parties, which are the main actors in democratic political life. It should be noted that the size of political parties has nothing to do with the extent to which they may be corrupt. Of course, a small party may be tempted to use dubious methods to compensate for its lack of members and funds, but the major parties maintain a substantial and costly machine that is not always easy to fund by legal means.

The decisive criterion is the system used to legitimize the parties in the eyes of the public. There is a fundamental distinction between legitimization by symbolic means, i.e. by convincing the electorate that the party is working for the common good, and legitimization by material means, which associates membership of a political movement with special access to public funds. The latter approach involves "buying" votes individually, which considerably increases the expense of politics.

But an investigation of the causes of corruption should not be limited to a one-dimensional view of the phenomenon. Although it may be true that corruption is linked to certain characteristics of the political and administrative system, it leads to effects that modify the system. These effects influence a kind of variable whose importance tends to be downplayed by economic theorists: the combination of factors that determine individual choices.

It might be said that corruption, by its very existence, transforms the system in the sense that it increases the importance of money in politics and conversely reduces opportunities to control the administrative machine. The development of the role of parties is instructive in this regard. In a democracy parties perform a number of basic tasks: they socialize political life, select political personnel, integrate citizens, reconcile specific interests with the general interest in their programmes, and help to shape government policy.

Like all economic agents, the corrupters and the corrupted obey rational motives based on a desire for gain.

Political careerism

Where the selection of political personnel is concerned, in a properly functioning democracy elected officials must be able to convince their fellow-citizens that their programmes are useful and be able to implement them when required. The satisfaction they derive from this is generally more symbolic (fame, authority, prestige) than material. In a corrupt regime the situation is different, and parties will tend to choose individuals who are good at making illicit deals which will bring in money to fill their coffers.

In this context, a political career is seen as a particularly rapid way of climbing the social ladder, especially since there is a growing interaction between the political and business worlds, giving rise to a proliferation of go-betweens who do not fully belong to either and therefore find it easier to break the rules of both.

For these people, the rewards of political life are necessarily material and undisclosed. Their role is to act as intermediaries, to oil the wheels of contact and negotiation between those involved in corruption, using as currency the supposedly confidential information that is the common coin of illicit deals[3].

Another function of political parties is to legitimize the system by integrating citizens into it. In a democracy, parties structure the

Clientelism and corruption are based on "values" which encourage clan relationships and the deliberate confusion of public welfare with private interests.

electorate and give voters a sense of identity. The latter is often handed down from one generation to the next via programmes that are presented to the electorate. Parties have to cast their net wide in order to win majorities; if they do not do so, groups of citizens representing special interests may proliferate.

In a corrupt system, on the contrary, the structure of the electorate is subject to very different considerations since there is a shift away from identification voting towards clientelism, with the vote as a kind of bargaining counter to be exchanged for favours.

Clientelism and corruption are based on "values" which encourage clan relationships and the deliberate confusion of public welfare with private interests. By encouraging a kind of purely individual and self-interested electoralism, corruption affects parties' capacities to act as social mediators. As they cease to represent the interests of the body of citizens, parties lose their ability to mobilize and to generate political ideas.

"Corruption is more inclined to secrecy than transparency, to small groups of initiates than the citizens at large." Below, a painting by the Canadian artist Sandra Dionisi (1994).



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The third function of parties in a democracy is to influence the development of public policy. Here too, if the people involved are corrupt, they are bound to be primarily concerned with those decisions that are most "profitable" in terms of bribes. They will tend to invest more public funds in those sectors of the economy that are least subject to scrutiny, creating a kind of vicious circle that weakens the authority of the public authorities and thereby their capacity to control.

What is more, by its very nature corruption looks more kindly on secrecy than transparency, on small groups of initiates than the citizens at large. Just as control is primarily guaranteed by transparency, when decisions are taken off the record illegal activities are less likely to be brought to book.

The carrot and the stick

When corruption becomes systematic, parties take on a new function. They "legitimize" the system by rewarding those who play the game and punishing those who don't. Where there is illegality, there is lack of confidence. Where the rule of law prevails, the law protects the parties to legal contracts against irregularities. In a corrupt system this protective role devolves on other actors: not content with lowering the moral cost of corruption, political parties make corruption commonplace by encouraging illegal practices throughout political life. They make sure that public contracts go to those who agree to play the game and not to those who refuse to do so.

Sometimes the majority and the opposition agree to "depersonalize" illegal practices by controlling administrative appointments, so that corruption becomes both anonymous and almost hereditary as generations of corrupt officials succeed each other as the years go by.

Because it scorns the basic principles of transparency in decision-making and equality before the law, political corruption robs the political system of legitimacy, and therefore of any consensual support in the country. Its inevitable consequence is that votes (and silence) must be bought by individual favours in order to compensate for the lack of a real democratic consensus. ■

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1. For a more detailed exposition of this view, cf. *Political Order in a Changing Society* by Samuel Huntington, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.
2. An analysis worked out by, among others, Susan Rose Ackerman in *Corruption: A study in Political Economy*, New York, Academic Press, 1978.
3. On this subject see the introduction by Alessandro Pizzorno to *Lo scambio occulto*, Donatella della Porta, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1992.

A hidden enemy

by Marc Germanangue-Debare



Degas and Parra © Ask Images, Paris

A news vendor in Santiago (Chile).

In over-regulated societies the underground economy can act as a safety-valve. In bloated form it jeopardizes economic development and undermines political liberties.

What is the connection between a Frenchman who does odd jobs about the house on Sundays, a Cairo shoeshiner, a drug trafficker, a Brazilian subsistence farmer and a voluntary Red Cross worker? Apparently nothing—except that they are all active in areas that form part of the underground economy.

The term is used to describe "every kind of economic activity which is pursued on the fringes of penal, social and fiscal legislation, or which is mostly not recorded in the national income accounts."[1] This definition itself comprises two types of underground economy: the hidden economy and the barter economy.

The hidden economy refers to illegal profit-making activities of many and varied kinds, which include drug trafficking, smuggling, procuring, corruption, tax fraud and forgery. In each case the activity is kept hidden (since it is illegal) and makes money—or saves it when tax fraud or evasion is involved—for the person who carries it out.

The barter economy is very different from the hidden economy in that it involves purely legal activities, whose only common denom-

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inator is that it they do not appear in official economic statistics (since they do not entail any exchange of money). Here again the examples are varied, ranging from voluntary work for an association (a sports club or political party, for example) or for a non-governmental organization (such as a humanitarian aid agency) to activities in the home (do-it-yourself, gardening, housework) and subsistence farming.

Despite the difficulties involved in measuring the invisible, experts have tried to quantify the underground economy phenomenon—in France, notably, where the National Institute of Economic and Statistical Information (INSEE) ventured a figure of 4.3 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the hidden economy alone (with 3 per cent accounted for by tax fraud and evasion). Estimates for Third World and East European countries are even more difficult to arrive at. It so happens that these are the countries where the underground economy plays a particularly important role.

In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, whose economies are in the process of going over to capitalism, and in the countries of the South, where there is a marked phenomenon of economic dualization, the underground economy often plays a more decisive role than in the rich countries.

Hidden billions

The underground economy existed in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. It even had unofficial links with the planned economy because, in its way, it provided "answers to the shortcomings and rigidity of the planned economy, and particularly to shortages, standardization, poor product quality and problems of getting supplies to cities."[2] A veritable black market grew up in this way. Certain highly prized but virtually unobtainable consumer goods such as vodka, meat and petrol were produced secretly and exchanged under the counter. It was not unusual, either, for employees to engage in "double work", in other words to do work on the side at their official workplace. The creaming off for private purposes of part of the output of certain state enterprises—in other words theft—also forms part of the underground economy. This parallel economy in fact marked a resurgence of the "market" which planning was striving to stamp out.

In developing countries, the underground economy is usually the predominant production method.

But whereas the planned economy disappeared in these countries with the collapse of their communist regimes, the parallel economy did not go the same way. On the contrary, it thrived on the ruins of the former system. The transition to a market economy cannot be carried out overnight, and people in the former Eastern-bloc countries will long continue to rely on the black market to obtain, for example, Western products which can now be freely imported there.

The dominant production method

Another aspect of the underground economy can be observed in the developing countries, where it is usually the predominant production method, though there are of course variations depending on geographical area and degree of development. But two principal forms can be defined: one of them, a "primitive" form, is mainly restricted to subsistence farming, while the other form, an "urban" one, encompasses various commercial activities such as craft industries, trade and very small-scale services such as street vending (drinks, fruit, cigarettes), shoeshining and "guided tours" for Western tourists.

In the 1970s, some national and international organizations such as the World Bank regarded such activities as survival activities that would necessarily die out as countries developed and modernized.

A completely different view has prevailed since the end of the 1980s. "The informal economy has acquired many virtues within the past few years: it generates jobs and income, can stand in for the state when it fails in its duty, and is an area where solidarity can thrive."[3] It

A parallel market in Moscow (Russia).

Les Stone © Sygma, Paris

has even been argued by some, including Hernando de Soto, an adviser to Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, that an informal economy is vital to the development process. It would seem that 39 per cent of the wealth produced by Peru derives from undeclared activities. According to de Soto, the informal economy has been growing because official regulations are too numerous and too rigid; they cause unnecessary delays for individuals and families whose needs are urgent. Take the example of housing. A small farmer wishing to settle in Lima will be obliged, if he abides by the laws of the official economy, to wait seven years and spend over $2,000 before being allocated land on which to build his house. The other solution open to him, which falls into the category of the informal economy, is to join the thousands who live in the Peruvian capital's shanty-towns (it costs nothing, and setting up house there takes only a few hours). In de Soto's view, the regulations are in urgent need of simplification.

The other side of the coin

It should however be stressed that the informal solution adopted in the case just described automatically brings in its train insecurity and a lack of public amenities, sanitation and running water. The young street vendors to be found in the great capitals of the South lead an equally precarious existence. One of the traps of the informal economy is that those engaged in it cannot rely on regular remuneration, often experience difficult working conditions and hardly benefit at all from schooling or literacy campaigns.

In the 1970s activities linked to the parallel economy were regarded as survival activities that would die out as countries developed and modernized. A completely different view has prevailed since the end of the 1980s.

The growth of the underground economy also goes hand in hand with a degree of laisser-faire by governments. The adoption of such policies can be dangerous in countries where democracy is either non-existent or still shaky. The risk is that increasing power will fall into the hands of mafias, in other words, groups likely to challenge both the authority of the state and the basic rights of its citizens.

To sum up, although the underground economy, in the poorest countries, has created a certain number of jobs, and even sustained a certain sense of solidarity and family unity, its growth on too extensive a scale presents very real dangers for both the economy and the political system of such countries. ■

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1. Pierre Pestiau, *L'économie souterraine*, Hachette, Paris, 1989.
2 Marc Debare, *Les milliards de l'ombre: l'économie souterraine*, Hatier, Paris, 1992.
3 Bruno Lautier, *L'économie informelle*, La Découverte, Paris, 1994.



James Andanson © Sygma, Paris

Imitations of an expensive brand, these watches were destroyed after being seized by the authorities.

© Florent Delatullaye, Paris

Easy come, easy go ...

by Rochel Andriambelomiadana

Politics dominated by cronyism and easy money is the road to ruin

Above, profits from drug-trafficking seized by the authorities.

Corruption in industrialized countries tends to be concentrated in the higher echelons of power; in the developing world it seems to extend to virtually every level of economic and social life. It may be limited in extent—as when it is simply a matter of unclogging the wheels of administration—but when a court verdict is reached as a result of bribery rather than objective judicial decision, or when a surgeon only operates when prompted by a wad of banknotes, it can be a matter of life and death. Corruption can even damage the economic life of entire countries.

When this is the case, corruption is far more than an occasional bribe offered to influence a public decision. It is an institutionalized system in which networks of cronies seek to enrich themselves by winning and keeping control of strategic political or commercial positions from which they can exercise illegal pressure. This system, which has international ramifications, is expanding. Action against it must be based on an understanding of the factors that encourage it to spread and an analysis of the effects of corruption on development.

Three key factors will be examined in this article: money, its link with politics, and poverty.

Oiling the wheels

In a commercial transaction, a sum of money is paid for something (a commodity or a service) which is itself the fruit of labour. Social success based on money is thus the visible fruit of effort. This social philosophy stimulated the rise of the industrialized countries.

Today, however, money is increasingly dissociated from labour. With the sudden rise in the prices of coffee, cocoa, oil and other raw materials in the early 1970s, huge quantities of

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At a civic education centre at Xai-Xai, in Mozambique, an instructor gives a one-man show to dramatize the importance of voting in elections.

money flooded the international financial markets and threw the economies of the industrialized countries off balance. To regain a certain stability, these countries were forced to export at all costs. Corrupting leaders of countries of the South appeared the most effective way of doing this.

Later, narcodollars replaced petrodollars, and today highly sophisticated techniques are used to launder the profits from drug trafficking via international financial circuits and networks involving bankers, stockbrokers, businesspeople, lawyers and politicians. Corruption and clientelism are the bedrock of the system.

Since there is no watertight partition between public money and money used to fight elections, politics is funded, without public consent, by creaming off the national wealth.

Daniel Pype © Jonier Marin, Paris

***Abismal-3* (1985), a drawing by Colombian artist Jonier Marin.**

As a result, money inevitably seeps into politics, perverting public administration and governance. Since there is no watertight partition between public money and money used to fight elections, politics is funded, without public consent, by creaming off the national wealth. Thus, political organizations are funded by illegal means and to stay in power depend on political forces whose support is earned by handouts from the state coffers. Slowly but surely, this use of money leads to a system of government based on corruption.

Squandering national resources

Poverty in developing countries is a breeding ground for corruption. A small minority of people get rich quick by illegal means from non-productive activities while the majority of the population wallows in poverty. Government officials are among the first victims: inflation erodes their purchasing power while their employer (the state) is unable to increase their wages. This largely explains why the hard core of corruption is found in government.

Other contributory factors to the spread of corruption are over-regulation and state interventionism in social and economic life.

While it is undeniable that widespread corruption paralyzes development, it may have some positive effects, albeit limited. Corruption brings about a redistribution of untaxed income, which absorbs some of the social costs of the notorious "structural adjustments". Furthermore, the transfer of income from the less poor to the very poor does promote social justice of a kind. But this circulation of money is merely a transfer of wealth, not a means of wealth-creation. Nor is it very realistic to argue that the informal economy, boosted by corruption that counteracts an over-regulated market, stimulates commercial activity. In reality, because of its weak productivity, the informal sector brings little added value.

The truth is that the more corruption gains ground, the harder it becomes to manage the economy. When the logic of production loses out to the logic of speculation, there can be no effective economic policy. Disequilibrium in

public finance, for example, is the result of a disparity between rising expenditure and stagnating tax receipts due to the size of the informal sector, fraud and tax evasion, not to mention the corruption of the tax authorities.

Corruption also goes hand in hand with a squandering of national resources at the very time when the latter should be exploited sustainably. It diverts these resources so that their contribution to the country's economic growth is insignificant. The problem becomes critical when the state, the main economic actor, is taken hostage by networks of predators. Furthermore, redirecting income from this system towards the consumption of imported goods puts pressure on the foreign exchange market, to the detriment of the local currency. The country's economic development suffers as a result of these interdependent factors.

When it is embedded in the power system, the parallel economy seeks purely and simply to control the distribution of a country's wealth.

A branch of the Central Bank of the States of West Africa in Bamako (Mali).



Bruce Clarke © Ask Images, Paris

Undermining democracy

Systematic corruption and clientelism undermine the workings of democracy by perverting the exercise of power and the expression of the will of the people. Power originating from the people is hijacked to satisfy the personal interests of those who possess it. It cannot be said too often that democracy becomes the worst of regimes when it lacks what may be its *sine qua non*, virtue. Without virtue, said Montesquieu, "the Republic is an empty shell and its strength becomes merely the power of a few citizens and the licence of all". Without virtue, professional ethics disappear, the state loses its authority, and institutions decline and become flimsy. The exercise of power becomes the art of governing on the basis of deception.

When it is embedded in a country's power system, the parallel economy seeks purely and simply to control the distribution of a country's wealth. It keeps the remorseless wheel of poverty turning: poverty undermines civic virtue; lack of civic virtue weakens democracy; a weakened democracy discourages development; without development, economic life collapses; economic decline further increases poverty.

This vicious circle can be broken by the will of the people, if the people realize the extent of the problem. The barriers between civil society and political society could then be broken down, paving the way for the country's responsible governance, the precondition of effective support from the international community. ■

Glasnost and after

by Leonid Pliushch

Institutionalized corruption was one reason for the downfall of the Soviet system

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***Each bureaucrat's desk is an obstacle on our road* (1988), a poster by Vladimir Veshtak.**

In 1987, the "Dictionary of Foreign Words" published in the USSR defined corruption as "Venality and misappropriation of funds by public figures, politicians and civil servants *in the capitalist world.*"

The definition was an absurdly naive piece of propaganda. It reflected a Manichean division of the world into two camps: incorruptible socialists here and corrupt capitalists there. It was also a typical expression of the very real Soviet understanding of the demarcation between the official line and everything else. At a time when corruption was reaching an unprecedented level in real life, any public statement on the phenomenon was held to be defamatory and punishable. Corruption, which officially did not even have a name, had become a typical feature of Soviet society.

By an irony of fate, the general public was becoming aware of corruption at the very time when dictionaries sought to obscure the reality. The revelations of the *glasnost* (openness of information) period revealed that, in the 1970s and 1980s, corruption was rife at the apex of the pyramid of Soviet power: the Politburo (or political bureau of the Party).

Regional mafias

The economic mafia was the first group in society to take seriously the declarations of Mikhail Gorbachev (elected General Secretary of the Party in 1985) on *perestroika* (restructuring, renewal). In the same year, it convened a congress of all its groups in the Soviet Union to assess possible threats to it from the Party's new general policy. This anxiety stemmed from the fact that Gorbachev had been close to the late Yuri Andropov, who had headed the KGB (or State Security Committee: the Information Services) between 1967 and 1982. In his day, Andropov had already opposed the "Dniepropetrovsk [Ukraine] mafia" by making use of compromising documents.

When he assumed responsibility for the KGB, Andropov, with the support of Eduard Shevardnadze, the Georgian Minister of the Interior, had begun to reveal the monstrous abuses committed by the Georgian communist party and by its first secretary, whose wife was the local mafia's protector. For its part, the Georgian KGB took care to ensure that neither the hidden sponsor nor the thieves were unmasked.

After dealing with the Caucasus, Andropov had even begun to clean up central Asia. But his sudden death in 1984 put an end to his investigations, and the "Dniepropetrovsk mafia" breathed again.

Inquiries were restarted in 1986. This time they were authorized by Gorbachev, who had consolidated his power in the party. They led to the arrest one year later of Churbanov, the deputy Minister of the Interior of the USSR and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's son-in-law.

In Uzbekistan, in addition to the Minister of the Interior and his inner circle, nearly 98 per

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cent of the regional militia services were arrested. Almost all the regional and district party bosses were convicted of theft, fraud and misappropriation of funds, and of organizing and protecting clandestine trafficking. They got off the hook by claiming that they were obliged to satisfy the increasing demands of the Central Committee, the government and the parliament of the republic.

In fact there was no clear frontier between the official sphere and the world of crime. The party bosses and their guests enjoyed the favours of prostitutes; thieves and murderers performed special missions for the Party, the militia and the KGB. In Moscow during the "years of stagnation" (1965-1985), almost one-third of all prostitutes and black-market currency dealers were agents of the militia and the KGB.

The hub of corruption

During *perestroika*, the Moscow bureaucracy tried to confine revelations of widespread pillage to the southern republics, thus giving the phenomenon an ethnic slant. The southern scandals were turned to good advantage by the empire, which claimed that the nationalist movements were inspired by local mafias that wanted to escape supervision by Moscow.

But in the final analysis all affairs on the outer rim of the USSR led back to the capital, which effectively protected all the mafias in the republics and was the true hub of corruption. Churbanov's trial not only implicated Brezhnev's representatives in the republics but Brezhnev himself, his family and immediate circle in the spiral of services which the party elite and the criminals rendered to one another.

In 1985, Gorbachev gave Boris Yeltsin the task of cleaning up corruption in Moscow by putting him in charge of the city's Party Committee. Yeltsin took his task to heart. He is said to have changed the staff of the Committee three times. Of the thirty-three secretaries of Moscow's District Committees, only ten remained in their posts. In the city's Party Committee alone, nearly 2,000 employees were arrested for misuse of power.

In late 1988, the Uzbek affair finally reached the Politburo itself, which persuaded Gorbachev to shelve the matter. The examining judges were accused of using illegal methods of investigation, and Yeltsin of totally misunderstanding his party comrades. This suspension of the fight against the mafia provoked suspicions of Gorbachev himself. By the same token it gave Yeltsin a popular authority that helped him to become President of Russia in 1991.

There was no clear frontier between the official sphere and the world of crime.

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What prevents perestroika? **(1988), a poster by Viktor Krasov.**

The communist paradox

Following the failed putsch of 1991, the new government tried to restore the assets of the "Party-State" to the state itself. Meanwhile, however, the capital had been salted away in Western banks. The rest of the assets accumulated by the *nomenklatura* (the official political, administrative and intellectual elite) was invested through front names in all kinds of private and "collective" companies.

Here lies the heart of all the paradoxes of the period of transition, of the "democratization", "decommunization", "decolonization" and "privatization" of the USSR: the former apparatchiks (permanent party members) in many cases retained control over an essential part of the apparatus of government, of parliament, justice and administration of the economy. It is they who inveigh against "class inequality in democracy" and claim to pursue an increasingly unrelenting campaign against organized crime. However, to understand the logic of this rise to power, we have to look back to the very origins of the Soviet state.

The beginnings of cancer

Soviet power was established in an environment of general impoverishment typical of wartime. It was based on forced labour, militarized administration of the state and the economy, and the requisition and distribution of goods by the state. The party's military monopoly over life, freedom and work explains the background to the birth of Soviet society in its state forms. Thereafter, the Party-State constantly recreated this environment which had become an essential feature of the new society.

The substitution of state ownership for all forms of private property transformed a stratum of all-powerful functionaries claiming to act in the name of the "proletariat" into the collective masters of Nature and of people. The economic disorder associated with militarization, the overwhelming domination of heavy tc the detriment of light industry and especially of agriculture, the rising deficit and

the prevalence of pillage would lead to a backlash on the individual level of theft and widespread bribery.

In the early days, the cruelty of the authorities to its own apparatus held the functionaries in check. They concentrated their efforts instead on the internal struggle to rise through the echelons of the bureaucratic hierarchy, where each post had concomitant privileges. When Khruschev put an end to the Stalinist purges of the state apparatus, individuals began instead to plunder state property, engage in corruption and seek semi-official extra benefits (special shops, hospitals, rest homes and so on). The official wages paid to workers were so low that they came to rely increasingly on theft. In a sense, the indulgence with which they were treated made them the accomplices of the system.

Generalized bribery

This gave rise to a whole system of parallel distribution of state production. A growing deficit and the flight of officially manufactured goods into hidden channels of distribution turned corruption into a dual system of mutual services. It was both vertical (in the apparatus of bureaucracy) and horizontal (in the production apparatus) through exchanges of stolen products or services rendered by one producer to another.


Коммунистическая партия Советского Союза
ПРАВДА
Газета основана 5 мая 1912 года В. И. Ленином
Орган Центрального Комитета КПСС

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These exchanges resulted in an entire illegal production system which had already begun to supply the black market in the days of Khruschev. Under Brezhnev, the official economy could no longer function without the parallel economy. No factory or kolkhoz director could avoid paying bribes to the companies with which he did business and on which he was dependent. Only a few isolated individuals refrained from diverting a part of the public service to their own advantage. Such eccentrics did not keep their jobs for long because their abnormal conduct threatened the general collusion. (Most prisoners of conscience and dissidents began their political protest by behaving in this way).

The system of bribes and services rendered became an original substitute for the money economy. An underground private economy developed and has been partially legalized in the current transition period to enable functionaries to retain their power to prohibit, authorize and manipulate. Officials exercise their arbitrary will in a twilight zone between legality and illegality, so that it is prejudicial only to the conduct of legal business. The vast sums which astute businessmen now invest in new spheres or in Western banks slip between two powers and two laws. In that environment, privatization does not help to create a market economy but merely hastens the pillaging of the national economy.

State ownership transformed a stratum of all-powerful functionaries claiming to act in the name of the "proletariat" into the collective masters of Nature and of people.

Contradictory trends

At the same time, society has admittedly been democratized to some extent. The rights movement has unmasked the lies of the communist system, developed the conscience of the intelligentsia and stimulated a demand in civil society for democratic freedoms.

Perestroika therefore seems to have been the expression of two contradictory demands, simultaneously reflecting the hopes of civil society for greater democracy and the appetite of the communist elite for the legalization of its privileges. The outcome of these opposing social trends will determine the nature of the economy and the institutional forms of the future development of the countries of the former Soviet empire. In the absence of a self-regulating market economy, they will continue to waver between a form of mafia-based state capitalism and the restructuring of an oppressive communist-fascist empire. ■

Left, *Glasnost* (1988), a poster by Gennadi Belozerov featuring the front page of *Pravda* ("Truth"), the daily newspaper of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. Written on the pencil is the word "glasnost".

The virus of power

by Eugenio Raúl Zaffaroni

Defence of the rule of law is the best antidote to the misuse of power

© Jean-Pierre Gaüzère, Paris

"Speculation has become a world-wide phenomenon." Above, drawing by Jean-Pierre Gaüzère.



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"Paradoxically, repression increases the opportunities for corruption."

Corruption is as old as the idea of the state itself. When the French philosopher Montesquieu set forth his theory of the separation of powers in the eighteenth century, he did so to fight corruption. He was not, of course, the first to join battle. The function of constitutional law has always been to organize the sharing of power in order to control the way it is exercised and prevent it from being misused.

The fields in which corruption occurs change with the growing complexity of the state apparatus (which takes on new monitoring and management functions), but its main form continues to be abuse of power. Unfortunately, legal experts have not yet discovered the infallible tool for nipping the evil in the bud.

The history of institutional law could be summed up as one of constant efforts by legal experts to build barriers against corruption and combat those who devote all their ingenuity to getting round such barriers. Some models, of course, are less well adapted to circumstances and allow corruption to gain a greater foothold than others, which tend to reduce its room for manoeuvre.

All power corrupts. . .

After many poor countries achieved independence, corruption in them was often encouraged and taken advantage of by certain

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"The fight against corruption must involve greater freedom of information." Above, *Existe* (1976), a work by the French artist Gérard Fromanger.

leaders of the rich countries, who saw it as a convenient way of recruiting obedient clients. Growing doubts about this kind of relationship in recent years have caused a breakdown in the mechanisms of "traditional" corruption.

We are very interested in corruption today, almost as if it were a new phenomenon, because it is beginning to disrupt economic and political life in the developed countries as well as in the developing countries where it has been going on for a long time.

Probably the only new element in the present situation is the fact that corruption is now feeding on itself—corruption in the developing countries is directly sustaining that in the industrialized nations. One of the objectives of the new world economic order is perhaps to try to stop corruption in the poorest countries, thus sparing them the exorbitant and uncontrolable accumulation of money that all kinds of illegal trafficking has led to in the rich nations.

Serious investment is needed to finance the apparatus of production, and this means a reliable, predictable legal system to deter speculators. Investors regard the misuse of power (and the corruption it encourages) as a threat; speculators see it as an opportunity. If the world economy is to be healthy and stable, it is clear that responsible investment must win out over speculation, otherwise the economy will be unstable with possibly disastrous results.

Speculation has become a world-wide phenomenon in recent years. This fact should be enough to dispel the illusion that the blunt instrument of the criminal law is the only weapon needed to roll back corruption. Globalization requires more rigorous control of corruption, and the only way to achieve this goal is to reduce the areas where corruption prospers. This means an across-the-board improvement of all institutions. No one simply wants to increase the repressive power of states.

To develop the state's repressive apparatus within a framework of defective institutions where there are no checks on power is to increase opportunities for abuse and encourage arbitrariness, violence—and eventually corruption. Advocating repression as a solution is a good ploy for politicians trying to whip up support from some parts of the electorate, but apart from that it is dangerously simplistic because paradoxically it increases the opportunities for corruption.

And so, even if the criminal law plays no small part in the fight against corruption, the first move must be to carry out political and institutional reforms designed to promote a better balance of power, greater freedom of information and speech and the widest possible participation by citizens in monitoring and managing public affairs.

A fight for democracy

One of the most difficult types of power to monitor is in fact the repressive power, which is by definition selective. The law comes down more heavily on some sectors of the population than others (just as the victims of crime are generally sociologically typecast), and this

To develop the state's repressive apparatus within a framework of defective institutions where there are no checks on power is to increase opportunities for abuse and encourage arbitrariness, violence and, eventually, corruption.

process whereby criminals and victims are selected has an arbitrary quality which can lead to misuse of power and to corruption.

Moreover—and this is perhaps the most important point—repression is much less effective as an instrument for regulating a polity than it is as an instrument of police surveillance. It is a dangerous illusion to think that essentially political phenomena can be regulated by repression. To give the police and bureaucratic machine the capacity for complete control—especially with the facilities made available by modern technology—is to expose it to a vast new field for dishonesty and abuse. The belief that corruption can be fought by increasing the discretionary power of those institutions which are most exposed to it is as absurd as seeking protection from wild animals by taking refuge inside their cages.

But corruption is not inevitable. If this threat, which is inherent in the very nature of power, is to be avoided, solutions must be sought in state political, institutional and bureaucratic structures and in a healthy civil society.

In short, the fight against corruption is a political struggle akin to the fight for a law-abiding state based on equality before the law. Yet a state based on the rule of law is never attained once and for all. Its existence depends on a regulatory principle that is in permanent opposition to the temptation of authoritarianism. Ultimately, the fight against corruption is an unrelenting effort to approach as near as possible to the values of a law-abiding state, to monitor and reduce the repressive forces that are inherent in this state and try to infiltrate into the slightest fissure in its institutional edifice.

> The first move in the fight against corruption must be to carry out political and institutional reforms aimed at a better balance of power, greater freedom of information and speech, and the widest possible participation by citizens in monitoring and managing public affairs.

Neutralizing corruption depends less on the severity of the repressive arsenal than on the existence of a truly democratic system, with strong political parties, a responsible civil society, respect for the rights and freedoms of everyone, an independent judiciary, and effective financial regulatory bodies. Another absolutely vital factor is the neutralization of the transnational levers of corruption, and this, of course, calls for new forms of co-operation on a world-wide scale. ■

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

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"The function of constitutional law has always been to organize the sharing of power in order to control the way it is exercised and prevent it from being misused." Right, *Pitt addressing the Commons* (1793-1795), a painting by Karl Anton Hickel.

J. Beauchamp © Sygma, Paris

What can be

From government action to citizens' initiatives, an arsenal of weapons to fight corruption

Corruption is in the news again, and fitfully, almost schizophrenically, we, the public, respond. On the one hand we are outraged. We call for firings and purges, for a new constitution and perhaps a new morality. On the other hand, we are resigned, and we passively reflect that nothing really can be done about corruption. Isn't it everywhere a fact of life?

In this article I should like to examine three aspects of the problem. Firstly, what is corruption? Secondly, what can a government that wishes to control corruption actually do? And thirdly, what if a government doesn't want to control corruption as much as we, the public, would like it to do? What can we do as citizens?

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What is corruption?

Corruption can be defined as the misuse of office for personal gain. Usage varies across countries and over time, and, at any particular place and time, law and custom may not coincide. Still, it is remarkable that throughout history, and around the world today, people have tended to agree that certain actions are "corrupt".

The real danger is the rise of systematic corruption, when the "rules of the game" are delegitimized by the perception that corruption can sway policies as well as particular contracts, can reshape legislation, and can make a mockery of the justice system[1]. Systematic corruption generates economic costs by distorting incentives, political costs by undermining institutions, and social costs by redistributing wealth and power toward the rich and privileged. When corruption undermines property rights, the rule of law, and incentives to invest, economic and political development are crippled.

Corruption exists in all countries and, as recent events have revealed, is a major problem in many rich nations. But corruption tends to be more damaging in some developing countries because it has a more devastating effect on property rights, the rule of law and incentives to invest. Systematic corruption now seems to threaten political and economic reforms in a number of countries in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia.

What is also news is that the international community is now discussing corruption openly, whereas even a decade ago the issue was virtually taboo[2]. Why is corruption surfacing now as an international priority? One idea that has been put forward is that systematic corruption is growing worse. Another

done?

by Robert Klitgaard

Italian magistrate Antonio di Pietro. In February 1992 he launched "Operation Clean Hands" (Mani Pulite) against high-level economic and political corruption in Italy.

© Ansa, Rome

cites the rapid rise of international trade and international communications, so that people are exposed to economic temptations as never before. Yet another points to the political and economic reforms that have swept the world and have created new opportunities for corruption by rapidly changing the accustomed rules of the game and, in many cases, because policy changes are not accompanied by sufficient development of the institutions and the public-sector incentives needed to make free markets and democracy work.

Or are we simply becoming less tolerant of corruption? One possibility is that we perceive corruption to be a greater obstacle now that the Cold War has abated and economic policies and multiparty polities are roughly "got right". Another possibility is that we blame corruption for the fact that neither freer markets nor democratic reforms have yet lived up to expectations, in order that we can avoid admitting that those policies and polities may *not* be right everywhere. Or perhaps we have become more aware of corruption because political reforms have granted new freedoms to document it and complain about it.

Whatever the reasons for today's greater concern over corruption, it is a change we should welcome. Corruption is a problem that has for too long been overlooked. What exactly *can* be done to attack deeply rooted corruption?

Virtually all countries have laws that condemn extortion, bribery, speed money, fraud and embezzlement, kickbacks, nepotism and other forms of corruption. But dual exchange rates, for example, are an invitation to illicit behaviour. So are quantitative restrictions on imports, the noncompetitive provision of services and regulations, necessary though they may be in particular cases. It is true that large public sectors invite more corruption than small-sized governments. It is also true that multiparty democracy will in the long run tend to reduce corruption.

What can governments do?

But whatever the mix of public and private sectors, and whatever the size of government, corruption remains a perennial threat. Combating it requires a deeper level of analysis and action than calling for a smaller state or for multiparty democracy. Fortunately we can learn from both theory and experience.

Theory teaches us that a rough formula for corruption holds. Monopoly plus discretion minus accountability equals corruption. Monopoly, whether public or private, grants the power to charge a higher than optimal price for a service and to provide less of it. Discretion means that an official has the power to say yes or no, or how much, without what lawyers call "bright lines" to limit his power. And a lack of accountability means that these transactions take place in the dark.

And so anti-corruption efforts must attempt to mitigate monopoly, whether public or private: to privatize a public monopoly and let a private monopoly ensue will do little. They must limit discretion and provide clear rules of the game and bright lines for bureaucratic behaviour. And above all, anti-corruption

The international community is now discussing corruption openly, whereas even a decade ago the issue was virtually taboo.

efforts must provide more accountability. Information is one enemy of corruption.

Here are some of the political lessons we can draw from successful campaigns to reduce corruption.

First, *fry big fish*. Leading figures involved in corruption must be publicly named and punished before a cynical public believes that an anti-corruption effort is more than words, more than a campaign against one's political opponents. It is important, therefore, that the first big fish must come from within the party in power.

For example, Hong Kong used to be awash in corruption. Then, in 1973, an Independent Commission against Corruption was formed. It had new teeth and new eyes, but despite its powers, at first no one believed that the ICAC would succeed any more than previous efforts. Credibility came when the ex-police chief of Hong Kong was extradited from retirement in England and punished in Hong Kong. The ICAC also nailed the ex-number two and scores of other high-ranking police officials. To a sceptical public and a hardened civil service, frying these big fish sent a credible signal: "The rules of the game really have changed".

Italy's recent and unprecedented success in attacking corruption has attracted world-wide attention. A crucial step was frying a top Mafia official, many top business executives and several major politicians from the ruling party. This told citizens that if they came forward and denounced crime and corruption, they could make a difference.

Second, *begin bureaucratic reforms with positive steps that help civil servants*. In particular, work with bureaucrats to define organizational objectives and ways to measure success, and then link part of their compensation to the achievement of results. It is ludicrous to ask public servants to fight corruption if they cannot earn a decent wage through honest efforts.

Third, after frying a few big fish, *get away from the investigation of the past and focus on prevention*. Here structural changes are worthy of systematic analysis. Also, a government may wish to consider the creation of a special anti-corruption agency whose role is not just investigating corruption but working with departments on systematic reforms in policies and procedures in order to reduce the vulnerability to corruption.

An anti-corruption strategy

Fourth, *have a strategy*. This may sound simple, but in fact most so-called anti-corruption campaigns lack just that. Having a strategy means developing a clear idea of ends and means in the short, medium and long terms. It means we must distinguish various types of corruption and recognize, even if we do not say so in public, that all types are not equally harmful. For example, corruption in the courts or in the police is usually more pernicious than corruption in the customs or in the driver's licence department. In general inspectors of all varieties must be cleaner than service-providers must be.

Having a strategy means that a government must recognize that it cannot attack all forms of corruption at once, even if it does not say so publicly. And a government interested in fighting corruption needs a success in the first six months.

Some political leaders seem to believe that they can excuse the apparent absence of an anti-corruption strategy by saying that they were not aware it was going on. This ignorance is no solace. Corruption is a problem of systems of information, incentives and rules. To combat it, one must think through these systems and change them.

Some governments are doing so. I see hope in the wave of new leaders around the world, who are putting good governance at the centre of their agendas. True, sometimes the anti-corruption crusaders themselves prove corruptible. But a global change in the will to address corruption is definitely taking place. There is

The logo of the non-governmental organization Transparency International, founded in 1993.

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An anti-corruption demonstration in Tokyo in 1989 at the time of the "Recruit" political-financial scandal.

Hashimoto © Sygma, Paris

also a remarkable new activism on this formerly taboo subject by international organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as bilateral donors such as Britain and France.

An international code of conduct

But can citizens themselves do anything to move a recalcitrant government toward action? The answer is yes. To see how, I believe we should ask several further questions. Aren't we—the people, the civil society, the private sector—part of the problem? We often criticize government corruption without recognizing our own involvement and culpability—and without exploring our own possibilities for fostering change.

On this score I also find grounds for optimism. As an example, let me briefly describe an exciting new initiative: Transparency International, a non-governmental anti-corruption organization analogous to Amnesty International that was launched in May 1993 in Berlin.

Amnesty International, which has chapters in most countries, investigates allegations of human rights abuses and publishes case studies and country reports. Although sometimes derided by governments, its work has had a tremendous influence by shedding light on dark corners of abuse, and has brought Amnesty International the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Might a similar idea work with regard to corruption? Imagine the following scenario: members of civil society and the private sector get together, devise and sign a simple code of conduct in which we promise not to pay bribes, not to underestimate costs in bidding and later reinflate them, and so forth. If such alleged transgressions subsequently occur, we agree to study the systems behind the allegations—for example, the system of procurement or contracting or customs clearance. We carry out confidential surveys of business people and citizens that identify how the corrupt system works, then suggest systematic remedies. We publish the results and push for change.

This is one of the ideas being pursued by Transparency International (TI), which is based on the principle that the private sector must begin to clean up its own act. By putting international credibility behind a code of conduct, TI will make it easier for private companies to turn down extortionate requests. By publishing illuminating reports, even if they have no legal status, it could increase pressures for reform. Some forty TI country chapters have been or are being formed around the world.

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An anti-corruption demonstration in Mexico.

I predict that by the turn of the century many country programmes will be successfully fighting corruption and that we will eventually look back on the 1990s as an era of the structural adjustment of government, when the fight against corruption was shaped by systematic reform of incentives, accountability and popular participation. ■



1. Two authors have recently and independently made a distinction between one sort of corruption, which is analogous to a foul in sports, and another sort, which is the breakdown of the rules defining and enforcing fouls, where the sports contest virtually collapses. The latter is the systematic phenomenon of corruption that they fear is undermining development. Luis Moreno Ocampo calls this "hypercorruption". Herbert W. Werlin's label is "secondary corruption", and he compares it to alcoholism. See Luis Moreno Ocampo, *En Defensa Propia: Cómo Salir de la Corrupción* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1993); and Herbert W. Werlin, "Revisiting Corruption: with a New Definition", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 60 (1994): pp. 547-558. Another valuable source is Jean-François Bayart, *L'Etat en Afrique: La politique du ventre* (Paris, Fayard, 1989).

2. A particularly valuable document is *Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development: Realities and Perspectives of International Co-operation, Practical measures against corruption*, a manual prepared for the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 29 May 1990.

UNESCO/Gil Jacques, Montréal

FEDERICO MAYOR: *COMMENTARY*

THE PRESS FOR PEACE

'We shall not let voices be silenced'

When a journalist is killed, not only does a person die but a voice is silenced and a part of democracy disappears. The silencing of voices is a well-known way of subverting peace. We shall not allow voices to be silenced.

It is UNESCO's duty to condemn all violence against women and men whose only weapons are their pens, their cameras, their intelligence, their talent and, above all, their faith in tolerance and the exchange of ideas.

But human and spontaneous though it may be, indignation is not enough. We must react, we must help those who believe in exchange and practise tolerance, and who want to do their job in difficult and sometimes dangerous circumstances. We must step up our efforts to ensure that journalists can work in greater security and that physical conditions are no longer an obstacle to the exercise of their profession.

It is also UNESCO's duty to do all it can to preserve and promote freedom of information and expression, thereby protecting plurality of ideas and opinions. UNESCO cannot, for instance, accept the disappearance of NTV Studio B, an independent television station in Belgrade that it has supported ever since the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (notably through a grant of $450,000 and by including it in a programme to exchange news items among independent TV stations in Belgrade, Sarajevo and Skopje, which was organized by UNESCO and World-wide Television News-WTN). NTV Studio B lost its independence a few months ago. Millions of TV viewers have therefore been deprived of pluralistic information at a crucial moment in the peace process.

Here again, indignation is not enough. For this amounts to an attack on the freedom of the press, which is an integral part of democracy and a culture of peace. UNESCO therefore will encourage the dialogue necessary to restore mutual understanding, without which there can be no democracy. By "democracy" I mean a general framework of public freedoms, not a specific government. I am thinking of the only voice that concerns us, the voice of the people. There can be no stable democracy if the press does not play its watchdog role, its vigilant observers describing not only what is happening but also what may happen, that is, all future possibilities and choices.

An independent press

But it is our conviction—and this is something that cannot be said too often—that the press must give priority to non-violence, to settling conflicts by means of dialogue, listening and understanding.

Without an independent press there can be no lasting peace, no future for democracy, no sharing of development. A press working for peace is an essential part of our hopes for everyone.

With these ends in view UNESCO has organized a series of seminars on the promotion of media independence and pluralism in Africa (Windhoek, Namibia, May 1991), Asia (Almaty, Kazakhstan, October 1992), Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile, May 1994) and, earlier this year, in the Arab countries (Sana'a, Yemen).

For the same reasons, an International Symposium on Copyright and Communication in the Information Society was held in Spain, from 11 to 14 March. At this meeting, leading specialists discussed the complex problems linked to telecommunications architecture, cable broadcasting, online information services and the protection of authors' and performers' rights. Their work will help UNESCO's Member States—particularly developing countries—to acquire high-level technological and legal data in these fields.

Developing local radio stations

Since 1982 UNESCO's International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC), whose purpose is to promote freedom of information and expression, has financed some 600 programmes in more than 100 countries, ranging from the creation of national and regional press agencies to media training and providing equipment. Half of all projects approved by the Programme are for private media. Last January IPDC approved 46 new projects designed to develop communication training and infrastructure throughout the world and to reduce the gap between industrialized and developing countries in this field.

Every two years IPDC awards a $20,000 Rural Communication Prize to encourage the work of independent and innovative media and to bring the largest possible number of communities into the "global village". In 1996 18 projects were submitted for the prize by institutions, groups and individuals engaged in remarkable efforts to develop rural communication.

Since its creation, the prize has been awarded to projects in India, Congo, Colombia, Cuba, Jordan and Mauritius. This year the jury decided to honour Tambuli, a community radio project in the Philippines, whose "Barranggyan sa Himpapawid" ("The village on the air") has transformed the lives of the people of Olutanga island. The Tambuli producers move from village to village, producing programmes on the spot with local people, using a simple karaoke recording machine.

For the moment the Tambuli network consists of six small community stations located in remote areas. The project aims to set up twelve. It has been created by local volunteers, who run it through a Community Media Council (CMC) whose members are drawn from a variety of professional, ethnic and religious groups and include a large proportion of women. After receiving basic training in radio work, the villagers prepare news bulletins and programmes, giving due prominence to local talent.

The Tambuli radio stations have had a stimulating effect on the towns around them, where life has become richer and there is greater involvement in the community. They have given people living in remote regions an opportunity to express their opinions on political, social and cultural issues, and have become a highly effective channel of communication for those whose voices had previously been unheard.

It cannot be said too often that freedom of expression and communication for all are fundamental to democracy and development, and hence to peace. For centuries we have lived in a culture of war, and we have learned to pay the price for war. Now we must learn and teach a culture of peace. ■

UNESCO past and

The watershed year of 1945 saw the awakening of a new spirit of planetary awareness that was to become one of the hallmarks of our century. The time had come for nations to be more receptive to one another and abolish the distances between them. In the euphoria of the postwar age a group of men and women who dreamed of a better future laid the foundations of UNESCO, an organization that would participate in the worldwide task of reconstruction and "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture". UNESCO came into being on 16 November 1945 at the close of an international conference in London, and held its first General Conference a year later in Paris, from 20 November to 10 December 1946 in Paris. Four days later it officially became a specialized agency of the United Nations.

As its contribution to the gigantic task of postwar reconstruction, UNESCO was called upon to repair intellectual and moral damage. The war had shown that ignorance could take a terrible toll and that powerful weapons could lurk in school textbooks. With these preoccupations in mind, the General Conference approved a programme for the dissemination of knowledge through education and mass information including a project for an in-depth review of textbooks and other school books.

By 1947 UNESCO was sending missions to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia to inquire into the most immediate needs of their people. A pamphlet entitled *The Teacher and the Post-war Child* was published with funding from the Greek government and was subsequently translated into German, Italian, Hebrew and Romanian. A number of youth service camps were organized, and pilot projects in fundamental education were launched in Haiti, China and East Africa.

The programme submitted to the first General Conference also outlined action to promote the free circulation of books and other information materials. A programme of exchanges for librarians was set up and preparations were made for a survey of library schools. An appeal was addressed to all countries, inviting them to publish selected national bibliographies; the first edition of the *UNESCO Bulletin for Libraries* appeared, and UNESCO established a Central Information Service.

As part of the same broad programme plans were made to replace scientific and technical equipment in war-devastated regions, to set up



present

by Jasmina Šopova

a world-wide radio network, and to study the tensions that lead to war. In 1947 field science co-operation offices were established in Rio de Janeiro, Cairo, Nanking and New Delhi, and grants amounting to $231,319 were allocated to various scientific institutions. One important project in the social sciences was launched to study all aspects of "international understanding", while others included a world inventory of research personnel and resources and the study of comparative law.

The same year, the Section of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies prepared a report on the philosophical principles underlying human rights, based on replies to a questionnaire that had been sent to 200 philosophers and thinkers and to the governments of Member States. UNESCO's Translation Unit examined the re-establishment and possible enlargement of the *Index Translationum*, a comprehensive guide to world translations that had been previously published by the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. The International Theatre Institute was established, and an international literary pool was inaugurated. The Museums Section was strengthened, and in co-operation with the International Council of Museums (ICOM) became an international centre for information and advice in this field.

In the single year 1946-1947, words had led to action. The first projects in education, culture, science, and communication had been launched. UNESCO was rapidly taking shape.

"UNESCO was convinced that it had before it a great mission and unlimited possibilities while at the same time being aware of the immediate urgency of its task," writes Fernando Valderrama, whose *History of UNESCO* traces the development of UNESCO from the foundations laid by its predecessors (the League of Nations Committee on Intellectual Co-operation and the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation) to 1993. It is a story that reflects an entire historical period. Photos from UNESCO's archives and the results of its programmes illustrate a growing record of achievement.

Based on material from archives and libraries, this richly documented book written by a leading Spanish researcher and former UNESCO staff member shows how programmes, projects and resolutions have not been mere words but have shaped whole chapters of contemporary world history.

"The purpose of this history," writes UNESCO's Director-General, Federico Mayor, in his preface, "is to retrace the whole development of an organization with a universal mission, in which the past informs the present, acting as a vital force injecting into it the emotion and drive that spurred its inception, its expansion, the experience of its mature years and the reflection on its role in a changing world that it has necessarily had to undertake." ■

A History of UNESCO by Fernando Valderrama, UNESCO Publishing, Paris 1995 (also exists in French and Spanish). For further information: UNESCO Publishing, Promotion and Sales Division, 7, Place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France. Tel: (33-1) 45 68 49 73 or 45 68 46 25; Fax: (33-1) 42 73 30 07. *A History of UNESCO* may also be consulted or ordered (185 French francs) via Internet: http://www.unesco.org

A MONASTERY IN THE

A prestigious monument of Orthodox Christianity in the Balkans, Rila monastery is also one of Bulgaria's richest architectural sites and a focal point of Bulgarian history. It was placed on UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1983.





L. Ruiz Pastor © INCAFO, Madrid

In the tenth century, a man named Ivan fled from the court of the Bulgarian kings to live a life of penitence in a remote valley of the Rila massif, whose summit is the highest peak in Bulgaria (2,925 metres), about 100 kilometres south of Sofia. A growing number of disciples joined the hermit, who took the name of Ivan Rilski, or John of Rila. They settled a few kilometres below his grotto on a site where they laid the first foundations of the future monastery.

Ivan Rilski died in 946. His relics were first taken to Sofia and then removed elsewhere. They were eventually returned to Rila in 1469, and his tomb attracted many devotees. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the monastery became a great spiritual centre and, thanks to donations from several Bulgarian kings, a power in the land. Though repeated conflicts set them apart over ownership of the land, Serbian and Bulgarian sovereigns were equally devoted to Rila. This is confirmed by their presence, side by side, on the monastery frescoes.

The ancient monastery was ravaged by fire in 1335, but saved by Khrelio, a feudal lord who chose it as a fortress and refurbished the buildings. In particular, he built a 22-metre-high keep followed, in 1343, by an adjoining chapel.

In the late fourteenth century, the Ottoman Turks advanced into the Balkans, but they respected the Christian faith and left



CHRISTOPHE CHICLET, a French journalist, has published many articles on the Balkans and a study, *Les communistes grecs dans la guerre* (1987; "The Greek Communists in the War").

MOUNTAINS

by Christophe Chiclet

L. Ruiz Pastor © INCAFO, Madrid

Above, the church of the Dormition (19th century).

Opposite page, Khrelio's tower (14th century).

Below, colonnades of the monastery's west wing.

the monastery its freedoms and prerogatives, confirmed in the next century by the Sultan's written order.

THE BULGARIAN NATIONAL RENAISSANCE

From the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries, as part of the Ottoman empire, the monastery became the leading cultural centre of southeast Europe. Books were written there and then circulated throughout the Slav Orthodox world. The monastery housed a library and archives; religious and secular schools were founded there, and icons and wood carvings were made. Festivals at the monastery attracted pilgrims from the whole Balkan peninsula. Rila had links with the other great centres of Orthodox Christianity—Constantinople, Mount Athos and Ohrid—and the old Bulgarian liturgy was preserved intact.

The role of the monastery broadened considerably from the eighteenth century onwards. Under the guidance of Neofit Rilski, a monk and pioneer of what came to be known as the Bulgarian Renaissance (second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century), the monastery was enlarged and modernized. Such famous master-masons as Pavel Milenko, Alexi Rilek and Kristju Debirlju helped to ornament it, while popular devotion attracted a host of volunteer workmen. Three wings were added between 1816 and 1820.

But in 1833 these new structures were destroyed by fire. The catastrophe aroused intense emotion throughout the country. Gifts, materials, builders and workmen poured in, and the damage was repaired in less than two years. This rapidity symbolized the national awakening in Bulgaria, of which the first signs had appeared at Rila with the publication in 1762 of the *History of the Bulgarian Slavs* by a monk, Paisij.

In the early nineteenth century, the monastery saw itself as a kind of enclave of national awareness and attracted the great thinkers and artists of the Bulgarian Renaissance. This cultural vocation is the main reason why it still has an important place today in the collective consciousness of the Bulgarian people, and enjoys such exceptional prestige.

NINE CENTURIES OF MONASTIC ARCHITECTURE

There is little trace of the early buildings erected between the tenth and fourteenth centuries because of the many fires and successive modernizations. However, a number of historical layers can be defined.

Between 1834 and 1860, various builders constructed the monastery complex that can be seen today. The main building is a rectangular fortress covering 4,500 m², with two





L. Ruiz Pastor © INCAFO, Madrid

main entrances for protection against hostile incursions. Its four four-storey wings are surrounded by great portico balconies giving onto a vast inner courtyard (3,200 m²) with polychrome façades. Each balcony is reached by a series of external staircases.

The monastery has more than 300 monks' cells and guest rooms, built and decorated in the styles of various Bulgarian towns (thus offering an architectural geography of the country), four chapels in the wings, the library, parlours, refectories and other utility rooms. The ground floor opens onto a gigantic kitchen where meals could be prepared for hundreds of persons. The domed chimney is built to a bold design; supported by arches, it is 22 metres high.

Lord Khrelio's keep, a stone tower in the internal courtyard, has survived the fire and the vicissitudes of history since 1335. It has five storeys. On the top floor, the family oratory is adorned with fourteenth-century frescoes representing a circle of dancers and a group of musicians, a very unusual theme in mural painting in the Byzantine tradition in this region.

The chapel which once flanked the tower was destroyed in the early nineteenth century to make room for the main church of the Dormition, completed in 1837. The church has three central domes, three naves and choirs. The walls and galleries are decorated with frescoes representing 1,200 different scenes and a group of portraits. The carved wood iconostasis (a partition covered with icons which separates the nave from the sanctuary) is one of the largest and finest in the Balkans.

But the Rila site is not confined to the perimeter and buildings round the inner courtyard. Outside the walls is the convent of Orlitza. It was built in the fifteenth century and has fifteenth- and seventeenth-century frescoes. A little further on are the church of the Presentation in the Temple and St. Luke's Hermitage with its two little eighteenth-century churches and monastic school. Still further away is the hermitage of Saint Ivan Rilski with the famous grotto to which the anchorite retired. In 1795, the monks added a church with a porch in which the relics of the saint are kept.

Monasteries are also working communities, as is shown at Rila by the Ptchelina farm complex of outbuildings, peasant dwellings and a little church (1834), the monastery oven (1866) and the clandestine powder mill for the monastery's armed guard.

Nine prestigious centuries

- **10th century:** the monastery is founded by the Bulgarian hermit, Ivan Rilski (876-946) or St. John of Rila.
- **14th century: 1335**, the monastery is enlarged and fortified by Lord Khrelio. The stone keep, in a very good state of preservation, is the only remaining vestige (Khrelio tower).
- **13th-14th centuries:** spiritual and artistic zenith of the monastery
- **14th-15th centuries:** start of the Ottoman occupation
  1469: The relics of St. John of Rila are returned to the monastery.
- **18th-19th centuries:** Bulgarian national renaissance. The monastery is the religious, intellectual and artistic centre of this movement.
  1833: disastrous fire
  1834-1860: the monastery is restored and rebuilt.
- **20th century: 1961,** the monastery becomes a national museum and protected site.
  1983: Rila monastery is placed on UNESCO's World Heritage List.

A MUSEUM COMPLEX

The monastery belongs to the Bulgarian state. In 1961 it was classified as a national museum and protected site, and today houses a historical and ethnographic museum complex. The rooms have retained their old character but are equipped with modern technical facilities. Exhibitions are held here and this is also a centre for research and study in museography and sociology.

The rich collections of objects and manuscripts bear witness to the centuries-old history of the monastery. They include the famous cross which the monk, Raphail, took twelve years to make (1790-1802), Lord Khrelio's epitaph and parchments in tenth-century Glagolitic script. There are also collections of goldware, ethnographic objects, close on 4,000 archive documents, icons, wood carvings, eighteenth-century illuminated manuscripts, carpets and costumes—41,000 pieces in all.

The communists did not ban the monastery, which was governed by the codes of the monastic community. Rila is distinguished among the hundred or so major Bulgarian monasteries not only as a centre of the spiritual and intellectual rebirth of the Bulgarian identity, long suppressed by the Byzantines and Ottomans, but as a holy place where religious activity has been pursued for almost ten centuries. ■

L. Ruiz Pastor © INCAFO, Madrid

Frescoes in the northern arcade of the church of the Dormition.



© Jacques Rougerie, Paris

Maquette of "Sea Village", an underwater facility designed by French architect Jacques Rougerie to house aquaculture farms and an astronauts' training base in the Virgin Islands (U.S.A.).

WATERWORLDS

by France Bequette

One-third of the world's population today lives less than ten kilometres from a lake or ocean shoreline. In the last fifty years the movement of populations to coastal regions has been growing, and several countries have already tried to increase their land area by expanding seawards.

Existing offshore installations and artificial islands, together with the marine cities of the future, were studied by 237 scientists from 21 countries at a symposium called "Ocean Cities '95" which was held in Monaco in November 1995 by a French association, Fondation 2100, and France's Society of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, with the honorary patronage of UNESCO and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat). According to French engineer and futurologist Thierry Gaudin, living on or under the sea is now within our reach as a result of recent progress in technology. Engineers can claim land from the sea by using rocks or concrete caissons (as long as coastal waters are not too deep) as fill, by using floating caissons, or by building under the sea. "We can harness solar, wind and wave power," Gaudin says, "desalinate sea water, feed ourselves by means of aquaculture or hydroponic agriculture, and communicate via dish antennae and satellites. Meanwhile, new materials such as polymers, elastomers, carbon fibres and a new kind of unreinforced concrete are fantastically successful in the marine environment." Many examples of marine installations already exist; many more are at the planning state. Some of them are described below.

FONTVIEILLE (MONACO)

The Principality of Monaco, one of the world's smallest states, provides a striking example of seaward expansion. Located on a peninsula between France and Italy, it has claimed land from the Mediterranean on several occasions.

© Christophe Lepetit, Paris

Unlike most of the world's maritime extensions and artificial islands—except for oil–prospection and -drilling platforms—which are found in depths up to 20 metres, Monaco's Fontvieille project, which was begun in 1966 and covers a 23-hectare area, involved working at depths of up to 35 metres. Fontvieille is now a fully-equipped urban settlement, with housing, commercial premises and offices, as well as a sports complex including a 20,000-seat stadium. Plans for extending the site even further are being mooted, but building a platform over 40 metres deep poses a number of problems, including that of swell.

FRANCE BEQUETTE
is a Franco-American journalist specializing in environmental questions.

Below left, Monaco's Fontvieille district with its stadium (centre).

Below, a barge designed to operate in the deep-water Nkossa oilfield off the Congolese coast.

© L. Zylberman/Elf, Paris



© Jacques Rougerie, Paris

Right, maquette of "Sea Sun", a scheme designed by Jacques Rougerie for a sea-borne park in Miami Bay (U.S.A.).

ARTIFICIAL LAKES AND OFFSHORE TOURIST CENTRES

Another interesting scheme was presented by French architect Michel Pinseau, who would like to create a tourist archipelago in the desert of southern Morocco. Pinseau noted that there are three large geological depressions 55 metres below sea level in the Sahara north of Layoun, and thought that they could be transformed into artificial lakes via canals connecting them to the Atlantic ten kilometres away, thus providing tourists with a hundred kilometres of sunny beaches all the year round. The biggest problem would be supplying the resort with drinking water, because there is not enough groundwater in the area. One possible solution would be to exploit the difference between high and low tides (3 metres) to operate small tidal power stations producing enough energy to desalinate the sea water.

Engineer Richard Dziewolski's "Marinarium" projects are even more futuristic. These "autonomous maritime tourist centres" are designed to blend perfectly into the seascape and respect the environment. Each centre consists of a floating unit equipped with breakwaters, houses, two ports for ferries and pleasure boats and a private beach. The Marinariums are completely autonomous thanks to facilities for filtering and desalinating sea-water, treating sewage and household waste and producing energy, and reservoirs for stocking fresh water and fuel.

Each Marinarium is designed to be assembled in a shipyard and then towed to the site and attached by cables to submerged dead weights. Using this system, it would be possible to anchor the floating city on a site where the sea is up to 2,000 metres deep. The Marinarium projects are based on tried and tested offshore drilling technology.

A striking example of this technology is a concrete oil-production barge designed for deep-water use (150 to 300 metres) in the Nkossa oilfield, 60 kilometres off the Congo coast. A floating island 220 metres long and 46 metres wide (total weight approximately 110,000 tonnes), the barge is unique. It is being towed to its destination and will house 30,000 tonnes of equipment and 160 people.

TOWN PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Japan has sought to claim land from the sea for many years, and John Pina Craven, a Hawaiian researcher, presented to the Ocean Cities meeting a report comparing filling operations in Osaka Bay (Japan) and in Boston (U.S.A.). In the nineteenth century Boston wanted to expand its usable land area by filling in Back Bay with soil from nearby hills; a similar operation has been carried out at Kobé to make an artificial island, Port Island. There is a big difference between soil that has been compacted for centuries and earth brought in from outside, which behaves like quicksand. The solution is to build "floating" structures, like the library of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), which rises and sinks according to the weight of books (and people) in it. However, this solution was not adopted at Kansai airport, which has been built at great expense (some $20,000 million) in Osaka Bay, and where fluidation of the fill following the 1995 earthquake has caused serious instability. Perhaps the Japanese should have chosen one of the floating turnkey airports on offer from Japanese firms.

Israel is thinking of building five artificial islands to solve its overpopulation problems. As there is a general shortage of fill material, engineers are thinking of using fly ash from coal-fired power stations as ballast for submersible caissons. A model island with a base area of one square kilometre has been designed to support towers for an estimated 20,000 permanent residents and up to 30,000 employees, visitors and tourists. The distance from the shoreline will be approximately one kilometre. Non-polluting energy production and sewage treatment facilities are planned.



© Research Committee on Osaka Bay, Osaka

Design for an underwater facility in Japan's Osaka Bay (architects Shigemochi Murota, Chiaki Kishida and Buichiro Murata).

UNDERWATER VILLAGES

French architect Jacques Rougerie suggests that we should build underwater. Between 1977 and 1981 he constructed underwater habitats and villages, named Galathée, Aquabulle and Hippocampe, which

have been tested in the course of scientific and educational operations in the Mediterranean. He has also designed a 50- to 500-inhabitant project called Sea Village for the Virgin Islands (U.S.A.), which is intended to provide a permanent base for scientists and other researchers, although much of it would be reserved for accommodation, leisure and sports facilities, as well as an underwater oceanic cultural centre.

GAPS IN THE LAW

If ocean cities and artificial islands develop, states will be faced with new legal problems. In the nineteenth century, the limits of territorial waters were set at 3 miles from the coast, i.e. the maximum distance reached by cannon shot from sailing ships. When firepower increased, territorial waters were extended to 12 miles. But who, beyond that limit, could now prevent the construction of a city, an airport, a pollution-producing factory, or even a prison? As Thierry Gaudin points out: "With law tailored for terrestrial nation-states, the status of the high seas is extremely vague. . . . The sea is like the Far West at the time of the Gold Rush. It may well become the Far West of the next century."

Yet the Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted by the United Nations in December 1982. So far it has been ratified by 63 countries (including Bolivia, which has no coastline), but—remarkable though it may seem—by none of the world's great maritime powers. Be that as it may, the treaty has no provisions covering the construction of floating or underwater cities. ■

Initiatives

British Columbia's shrinking rainforest

The Raincoast Conservation Society (RCS) of Canada is sending out an SOS to draw attention to the situation of the rainforest in British Columbia, where entire mountainsides have been denuded of trees by logging and beaches are strewn with thousands of logs, blocking access to the sea. The amount of wood logged since 1911 amounts to approximately 1.3 billion cubic metres, enough timber to load 3.7 million logging trucks. Laid end to end the logs would twice circle the globe. Only 200,000 hectares of this old-growth forest are protected, in two reserves and four parks. Clear-cutting is going on at the rate of 40 to 50,000 hectares per year.

The Amazon rainforest attracts a lot of news coverage, but few voices have been raised against the massive exploitation of the world's oldest and largest temperate rainforest, which stretches for 900 km. along British Columbia's Pacific coast and covers about 6.5 million hectares. Of 354 coastal watersheds greater than 5,000 hectares, two-thirds have been opened to mining and logging. Vancouver Island is home to the champions of the Canadian rainforest: one red cedar with a circumference of almost 19 metres could be as many as 2,000 years old; a Douglas-fir with a broken top is 74 metres tall and more than 12 metres around; there is a towering 95-metre-tall Sitka spruce. Many of the biggest trees ever to grow in the rainforest have already been cut down. Any undiscovered giants that may be hiding in the remotest valleys are still unprotected.

This exceptionally wet habitat (rainfall averages from one to two metres per year) is home to moss, lichen, some 3,000 species of mushroom and a wide variety of animals including grizzlies, black bears and the rare Kermode white bear, wolves, deer, wolverines, pumas, lynxes, stoats, beavers and minks. Grizzlies are under threat from clear-cutting, hunting and poaching. Even wild salmon, which until recently abounded in the region's rivers, are now less numerous because of overfishing and the introduction of salmon hatcheries (the wild fish often get intercepted in harvests targeting artificially reared salmon).

A dozen Indian First Nation communities, which have always occupied these lands, have organized spectacular demonstrations—so far without success—at the headquarters of the provincial government which grants logging licences. One of their traditions is to try to conciliate the powers of nature by carving immense totem poles from red cedar. Is it too far-fetched to wonder if some day, for want of trees, they may have to carve their totems in concrete? ■

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

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THE DESERT OCTOPUS

First described by Austrian botanist Friedrich Welwitsch in 1859, Welwitschia (*Welwitschia mirabilis*) is a rare plant found only at a few points in the Namibian Desert. In appearance it is a large brown stump with huge ribbon-like, verdigris leaves, and a root system that spreads for dozens of metres around it on the ground surface. Scientists still do not know how the plant collects its only source of moisture, morning dew. Botanists believe it may live for several centuries, perhaps even for a thousand years.

FOLLOW THAT FISH

The inner ears of fish contain otoliths, chalky concretions that develop throughout their lives by forming growth rings. Researchers in the sclerochronology (the analysis of growth by studying animals' hard tissues) laboratory established by the French Institute of Scientific Research for Development and Co-operation (ORSTOM) and the French Research Institute for Exploiting the Sea (IFREMER), are looking at otoliths as black boxes, similar to those used in aircraft, which contain data on the age and growth of the fish and also record accidental pollution or sudden changes in their habitat. The messages hidden in the otolith are still very hard to decipher, but they may be a trail worth following.

A RABIES VACCINE

Since 1993 a new rabies vaccine, Raboral, developed from a genetically modified virus, has been successfully used on an experimental basis in the Ardennes forest of Belgium, where foxes are the main vectors of the disease. Vaccine-bearing bait is scattered from a helicopter. The results have encouraged the U.S.A. and Mexico to use the same technique to vaccinate other rabies vectors, Texas coyotes and vampire bats. Some scientists, however, have reservations about the risks involved in spreading such a virus in nature, where it could combine with wild viruses to produce new diseases.

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THE SIBERIAN TIGER: GROWING OLD GRACEFULLY?

Although the skeleton and hide of a Siberian Tiger (*Panthera tigris altaica*) can be sold for up to $50,000, tiger poaching in eastern Russia has considerably declined due to the activities of new anti-poaching patrols. However, degradation of the environment through deforestation, which thins out the numbers of the animals the tiger feeds on, continues to threaten the Siberian tiger's survival. The Russian government has appealed to "consumer" countries to stop buying tiger products and has asked for their help in financing a tiger sanctuary, which would halt logging operations in areas where tigers and other threatened species are found.

WATER WATCHING

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), with help from the World Bank, has begun promoting a new global system known as WHYCOS (World Hydrological Cycle Observing System) to observe the hydrological cycle. The French Institute of Scientific Research for Development and Co-operation (ORSTOM) has been asked to house the MED-HYCOS pilot regional centre, which will monitor the Mediterranean basin and the Black Sea. 150 computerized platforms, equipped with "intelligent" sensors that will send back a stream of information on the quality of the water and the climate, will be set up to cover the region's main watercourses. Upcoming programmes will be concerned with southern Africa, western and central Africa, the Aral Sea and Latin America.

THE CEDARS OF LEBANON

The beautiful cedar of Lebanon (*Cedrus libani*), one of the world's four cedar species, can live for a thousand years, grow 40 metres high and have a circumference of 8 metres. Although it is the national emblem of Lebanon, the country's cedar population is dwindling. Fifteen years of war have halted reforestation programmes, and today there are less than 2,000 hectares of cedar forest. In 1991, a Lebanese woman, Desirée Aziz, founded the International Committee for safeguarding the Cedar of Lebanon and established a nursery that produced 12,000 plants the following year. Since 1994 schoolchildren have been involved in the programme. They are asked to plant 50 cedars at the entrance to each village, to water young plants and to protect them from goats—at least during the first ten years when the trees develop many more roots than branches.

CACTUS BUGS

In an effort to enforce the Washington Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), officials have come up with the high-tech idea of implanting electronic chips in plant species at risk. A chip about the size of a grain of rice is injected into the plant through a hypodermic needle and read by an external device. The experiment has already proved successful in rare plants in southern Africa and will next be tried in rare Mexican cactus, which are under threat from smugglers.



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'MUSIC IS FOOD FOR THE SOUL'

Isabelle Leymarie talks to

GALINA GORCHAKOVA

Russian soprano Galina Gorchakova is one of today's most expressive opera singers. The daughter of musicians, she was educated at the Conservatory of Novosibirsk in Siberia. Since making her debut in Russia in 1988 she has sung on the world's great stages, including Covent Garden, La Scala, the Metropolitan Opera House and the Kirov. She talked to Isabelle Leymarie in her dressing room during a visit to Paris.

■ **When you study a new role, how do you get into the character?**
Galina Gorchakova: I have no set way. My interpretation is shaped by the music and my voice. I sit down at the piano and work on the phrasing; I listen to recordings and watch videos. Singers influence each other, but there are always differences between them. When I know the part, I rehearse it with the concert master. The dramatic aspect is essential. I have to live and breathe the role. The character has to get to my heart and become mine.

■ **Does your conception of a role ever diverge from the director's?**
G. G.: I usually have my own conception of the character, but when I meet the director, my approach sometimes changes radically. I have to make compromises. For example, my own reading of Tatiana, the heroine of *Eugene Onegin*, Tchaikovsky's opera based on the poem by Pushkin, does not exactly correspond to the way I sing the role today. It's a role I know well; it was the first one I sang at the Sverdlovsk Opera. I always defend my point of view, but if the director is worth his salt, he always wins. Of course it's fantastic when the director's approach is the same as mine. Since I'm rather headstrong, I sometimes have to make an effort not to annoy the director.

■ **Is it hard to skip from one repertory to another? From Russian to Italian, for instance?**
G. G.: No, it comes naturally to me. I was raised that way, and my second culture is Italian. I have also sung French opera, Gounod's *Faust*, for example, but in general I'm less familiar with the French repertory. On the other hand, there is one role I've never sung but would love to try because I identify with her, and that is Carmen.

■ **Have you ever sung Mozart?**
G. G.: If I had to sing Mozart, if my life depended on it, I would, of course—I've got the power and the intellectual capacity to do it! [Laughs] But as an artist, I'm not attracted to Mozart. Some people think *Don Giovanni* is an absolute masterpiece, but it leaves me cold. I'm very emotional and fanciful, not at all methodical, and Mozart's music bores me. I much prefer Verdi, especially his later work, Puccini, Tchaikovsky and Richard Strauss. They are closer to my passionate temperament.

■ **What about contemporary operas?**
G. G.: Prokofiev is the most modern composer I've sung so far, the role of Renata in *The Flaming Angel*.

■ **Are there any Russian composers you'd like to make better known abroad?**
G. G.: More than Russian composers, there are certain works by Tchaikovsky I'd love to make known because they are rarely performed outside Russia. I'm thinking particularly of *Mazeppa* and *Yolanta*.

■ **What are your favourite roles?**
G. G.: I like them all, but at different times and for different reasons. Right now, Tatiana, of course, since that's the role I'm singing. But it's more than just singing. I live and breathe Tatiana!

■ **How do you manage not to wear out your voice with such a busy schedule?**
G. G.: I rest, I sleep; I go for walks. I make sure that I don't take certain drugs, especially those containing hormones because they can change your voice. A beautiful voice is largely a matter of well-trained muscles. Under the effect of certain emotions one's voice can start to tremble. Opera does not allow that kind of weakness.

The atmosphere of an opera house can also influence singers, for better or for worse. Everything at the Bastille Opera House in Paris, for example, is designed to put the singer at ease. It's a quiet place, and singers work well there. But I remember one time at Milan's La Scala when the atmosphere was electric. The theatre people were getting very agitated all round us, and I could feel myself getting angry. But stress stimulates me rather than upsets me. In Milan I reacted to all the bother by saying to myself, "I'll show them what I can do!"

■ **How do Russian audiences respond to you?**
G. G.: Badly! I spend most of my time on tour, and I frequently travel with my husband, my mother and my son. All the same, I spend four months of the year in St. Petersburg. People go on about the "Slavic soul", but I find Russian audiences rather cold. No one is a prophet in their own country, of course. Perhaps one reason for this coolness is that the St. Petersburg public is very spoiled. As far as I'm concerned, the warmest audiences are the British, the French, the Hong Kong Chinese, the Americans and the Italians.

■ **I suppose that as a result of so much travelling you feel at home anywhere.**
G. G.: Yes, what interests me most is to produce a heartfelt response, to get people to think of something more than material things, to think of their souls as well as food and clothing. After all, music is food for the soul. ■

RECENT RECORDINGS:

- Galina Gorchakova
  Verdi/Tchaikovsky: *Arias*
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- Kirov Opera and Orchestra/Valery Gergiev
  Tchaikovsky: *Yolanta*
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ISABELLE LEYMARIE, a Franco-American musicologist, has recently published *Du tango au reggae, Musiques noires d'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes* ("From the Tango to Reggae: Black Music from Latin America and the Caribbean", Flammarion, Paris, 1996).

'Culture must be one of the foundations for world understanding'

by Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

In order to grasp the full significance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is well to be fully aware of the world situation that gave birth to the United Nations and to UNESCO. The devastation wrought by the wars of the last half century had brought home the fact to everybody that, with the present-day level of technical achievement, the security of nations could be based only on supra-national institutions and rules of conduct. It was understood that, in the long run, an all-destroying conflict can be avoided only by the setting up of a world federation of nations.

So—as a modest beginning of international order—the United Nations was founded. This organization, however, is but a meeting ground for delegates of national governments and not for the peoples' representatives acting independently on the basis of their own personal convictions. Furthermore, U.N. decisions do not have binding force on any national government; nor do any concrete means exist by which the decisions can be enforced.

The effectiveness of the United Nations is still further reduced by the fact that membership has been refused to certain nations, whose exclusion seriously affects the supra-national character of the organization. Yet, in itself, the fact that international problems are brought up and discussed in the broad light of day favours the peaceful solution of conflicts. The existence of a supra-national platform of discussion is apt to accustom the peoples gradually to the idea that national interests must be safeguarded by negotiation and not by brute force.

This psychological or educational effect I regard as the United Nations' most valuable feature. A world federation presupposes a new kind of loyalty on the part of man, a sense of responsibility that does not stop short at national boundaries. To be truly effective, such loyalty must embrace more than purely political issues. Understanding among different cultural groups, mutual economic and cultural aid are the necessary additions.

Only by such endeavour will the feeling of confidence be established that was lost owing to the psychological effect of the wars and sapped by the narrow philosophy of militarism and power politics. No effective institution for the collective security of nations is possible without understanding and a measure of reciprocal confidence.

To the U.N. was added UNESCO, the agency whose function it is to pursue these cultural tasks. It has in a greater measure than the U.N. been able to avoid the paralyzing influence of power politics.

Realizing that healthy international relations can be created only among populations made up of individuals who themselves are healthy and enjoy a measure of independence, the United Nations elaborated a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 10 December 1948.

The Declaration establishes a number of universally comprehensible standards that are designed to protect the individual, to prevent his being exploited economically, and to safeguard his development and the free pursuit of his activities within the social framework.

To spread these standards among all U.N. Member States is rightly regarded and aimed at as an important objective. UNESCO has accordingly instituted this third celebration for the purpose of drawing attention far and wide to these fundamental aspirations as a basis on which to restore the political health of the peoples.

It was scarcely to be avoided that the Declaration should take the form of a legalistic document, which in its rigidity may lead to endless discussion. It is impossible for such a text to take the great diversity of conditions of life in the different countries fully into account; in addition, it is unavoidable that such a text admits various interpretations of detail. The general tendency of the Declaration, however, is unmistakable and provides a suitable, generally acceptable basis for judgment and action.

To give formal recognition to standards and to adopt them as the guiding lines of action in the teeth of all the adversities of a changing situation are two very different things—as the impartial observer may see particularly in the history of religious institutions. The Declaration will only exert effective influence, when the United Nations itself shows by its decisions and actions that it does embody, de facto, the spirit of this, its own Declaration. ■

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

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